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NEW MODELS FOR THE COMPENSATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES DAMAGE
MICHAEL FAURE AND JING Liu*
ABSTRACT
Current regulation and liability schemes ineffectively prevent and
routinely under compensate natural resources damages. Compensation
instruments, such as liability insurance, direct insurance, risk sharing
agreement, environmental funds, and guarantees provided by liable parties
or third parties can be used to better achieve efficient prevention and
compensation. This article identifies three such models, combining
regulation, liability rules, and compensation instruments. This article also
identifies various factors to be considered when choosing a particular
compensation scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrialization and modernization results in damage to the natural
environment that supports human life. Regulation of environmental
degradation has long been employed to temper environmentally harmful
activity, but regulatory successes are inconsistent. Environmentally harmful
activities have historically resulted in significant losses to both individuals
and to the environment itself. The economic value of the environment, and
corresponding damage to individuals, are within the scope of liability law
typically remedied via damage awards. However, the environment is valued
ecologically, aesthetically, and culturally, making it more difficult to
remedy via traditional liability concepts. Given its unique value, the
environment makes restoration a more effective remedy than monetary
compensation. This article attempts to identify various models that can
provide optimal prevention and restoration of damage to the environment
itself. Before discussing the designs of specific compensation models, this
article briefly introduces some important foundational concepts.
Environmentally harmful activities cause damage both to
individuals and to the physical environment itself. Harm to individuals has
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long been recognized as compensable under tort law. However, physical
environmental has historically only been compensable to the extent of its
economic value as a natural resource. This article focuses on the latter kind
of damage, damage to the physical environment. There are several terms
used to denote environmental damage in different jurisdictions. For
example, in the United States, the term "natural resources damage" is used
in legislation and literature. Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act' (CERCLA) and Oil Pollution
Act 2 (OPA), some government authorities and Indian Tribes are allowed to
recover damages caused by "injury to, destruction of, or loss of (loss of use
of) natural resources."3 The term "natural resources" is broadly defined in
CERCLA and OPA to include "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground
water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to,
managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the
United States . . ., any State or local government, or any foreign
government."4 According to this definition, natural resources damage
includes not only the elements subject to private property rights such as
land and minerals, but also public goods such as wildlife, birds, and fish.
Injury to the natural resources is obviously included in "natural resources
damage" but damages suffered by the public at large as a result of the
environmental damage also qualify.s
In Europe, different terms are used. Under the Directive
2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 April 2004
on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying
of Environmental Damage (ELD), a liability and administrative regime for
"environmental damage" was established.6  Direct damage to the
environment is included in the ELD definition, but no personal injury and
property damage caused via the environment is included.! Hence the
European notion of "environmental damage" is more restrictive than
"natural resources damage" as defined by the United States. It is limited to
three components of the environment: protected species and natural
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (2012).
2 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2012).
'42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A) (2012).
4 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(16) (West 2012); 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(20) (West 2012).
s Edward H.P. Brans, Liability for Damage to Public Natural Resources 21(Daniel Bodansky
& David Freestone eds., 2001).
6 Directive 2004/35/CE, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
the Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage,
2004 O.J. (L143) 56 [hereinafter ELD].
7 Id. art. 2.1.
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habitats, water (as defined in Directive 2000/60/EC), and land.8 "Ecological
damage" is another oft used term popular among European scholars. Three
approaches are used to demarcate this term. The most restricted
interpretation limits damages to natural resources not subject to property
rights.9 However a broader approach defines it as damage to the natural
resources lacking market value.'o Under the third approach, the term
"ecological damage" refers to damage to the environment regardless of the
existence of property rights." Given the differences in the use of
terminology, for the purpose of this article, we prefer the term "natural
resources damage." This term includes not only damage to un-owned
components of the environment (public natural resources), but also damage
to owned components (private natural resources) having ecological value in
excess of their sentimental value to their owners.
The term "compensation" usually implies monetary damages,
which is of secondary importance in regards to natural resources damage.
The environment is considered by economists to have both use and non-use
values.12 Use value is the value derived from people's actual use of the
environment, which can be evaluated through market values.'3
Alternatively, non-use values cannot be measured by the market value of
the natural resources.14 For example, "existence value" is an important non-
8 Id.
9 BRANS, supra note 5, at 17-19.
'o For example, when discussing the "Patmos" case, Maffei defined "ecological damage" as
"a kind of damage devoid of an economic value but based upon a legal interest of the State in protecting
the quality of the public domain per se." Under this approach, many unowned natural resources and
some owned ones having an ecological value that is not reflected in the market value of the property, but
are included in the definition of ecological damage. Maria Clara Maffei, The Compensation for
Ecological Damage in the "Patmos" Case, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
HARM 381 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scavazzi eds., 1991).
1 See Hubert Bocken, The Compensation of Natural Resources Damage in Belgium, in
HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT: THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 150-
52 (Peter Wetterstein, ed., 1996).
See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 281-85
(1989).
, See id. at 281-82.
4 It is widely accepted that natural resources have both use and nonuse values. However,
differences still exist in the concrete classification of the values. For example, Cross differentiates the
values of natural resources damage into three types: use value, existence value, and intrinsic value. See
id. The latter two types of values are identified as nonuse values by other scholars. For example,
Dobbins and Kanner & Nagy differentiate the values of natural resources into two types: use value and
nonuse value. According to Dobbins, use value includes the direct use of natural resources and option
values. The option value does not involve the immediate use of a natural resource, but the possibility
that the resource may be used someday. The option value incorporates the bequest value of a resource
that is to preserve the resource for the use of future generations. As for the nonuse value, both existence
value and intrinsic value are contained. Kanner & Nagy define use value to include both consumptive
uses and non-consumptive uses. They further differentiate nonuse values (existence value) into option
value, vicarious value, and intertemporal value. Jeffrey Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of
Environmental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 898-
908 (1994); Allan Kanner &Tibor Nagy, Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural Resource Damage
Actions, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 417, 421-24 (2005).
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use value of natural resources that cannot be valued by the market.' 5
Compared to monetary damages, restoration provides a more effective
approach, as it includes both the use value and non-use value of natural
resources. 16 In both the United States and Europe, restoration has been
established as the primary approach to remedy natural resources damage. 17
This paper uses the term "compensation" instead of restoration, because the
former has a broader meaning. For example, in the time between the
creation of the environmental damage and the completion of the restoration,
the resource's functionality is diminished. The value of this lost function
can be compensated monetarily.8 In other words, physical restoration is
but one method of remedying natural resources damage, and hence only one
part of compensation. However, in the context of natural resources damage,
the term "compensation" includes "restoration," as well as other forms of
compensation necessary to fully remedy the environmental harm.
Each compensation instrument has advantages and disadvantages.
This article indentifies various scenarios of compensation, as well as the
different factors that make certain compensation instruments more effective
than others in particular circumstances. In other words, indicators are
provided to illustrate how these compensation instruments are more or less
advantageous given different circumstances.
The article analyzes the various instruments available to
compensate for natural resources damage. The authors provide a positive
analysis by exploring both the theoretical and practical implications of
mechanisms aimed at preventing and compensating natural resources
damage. In addition to sketching these various compensation models as
they appear in the literature and in various international legal systems, the
authors also provide a critical normative evaluation of the advantages and
disadvantages of various instruments currently in place to compensate for
natural resources damage. In that respect, the authors use a law and
15 See Cross, supra note 12, at 289-9 1.
16 See Cross, supra note 12, at 298.
17 A rule was initially established by the U.S. Department of the Interior damage assessment
regulations under CERCLA. Under this rule, natural resources damage is limited to the lesser of
restoration costs or diminution of economic use values. The application of this rule was, however,
rejected in the case Ohio v. Dep't ofInterior, where the court found that restoration was intended to be
the basic measure of recovery. Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In
Europe, operators are also required to take remedial action in case of environmental damage and to bear
the costs of the actions.ELD, supra note 6, art. 6, 8.
'8 For example, this value is compensated as "compensable value of the services lost to the
public through the completion of the restoration" under the CERCLA assessment regulation, and as
compensatory remediation under the ELD. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (1986); ELD, supra note 6, annex 11.
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economics framework, specifically the approach provided in Guido
Calabresi's well-known costs of accidents. 19 Using this economic analysis,
the authors propose a multi-layered approach to compensate natural
resource damages, distinguishing between situations where a liable injurer
can and cannot be identified.
This article initially explores the occurrence of continued natural
resource damages, despite the many existing instruments aimed at
preventing loss. Given this reality, the authors then explore optimal
compensation mechanisms. Specific features of natural resources damage,
which may influence the design of the compensation system, are then
briefly discussed. Authors then develop optimal prevention and
compensation models, which combine regulation, liability rules and
compensation instrument. Three models are presented in this article,
applying both mandatory or voluntary financial security systems. These
three models illustrate that different kinds of compensation instruments are
desirable given different circumstances. Each instrument responds
differently to a given situation. Further this article explores indicators
important in choosing compensation instruments. Finally, the article makes
a comparison between these instruments and makes recommendations
concerning the use of specific instruments. According to the indicators and
characteristics of the specific instruments, the article finally makes
suggestions for choosing instruments and building compensation systems
under different scenarios.
II. PREVENTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES DAMAGE
Which instruments are primarily used to prevent natural resources
damage? Regulation is an important instrument in addressing natural
resources damage, but licenses and permits are also used to ensure that
operators are qualified. Additionally environmental standards, such as
emission standards, are essential to sustain environmental quality.
Environmental taxes are designed to achieve optimal internalization of
natural resources damage costs. Economic literature illustrates that in spite
of their positive effect on compensation and corrective justice, the primary
goal of liability rules is deterrence. 2 0 A substantial amount of literature
compares regulation to liability rules, analyzing how both mechanisms
work to minimize the social costs of accidents.2 1 Instead of arguing that one
19 See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970).
20 Michael Faure & David Grimeaud, Financial Assurance Issues of Environmental Liability,
in DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY, AND COMPENSATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY- FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 19-20 (Michael Faure ed., 2003).
21 See, e.g., Michelle J. White & Donald Wittman, A Comparison of Taxes, Regulation and
Liability Rules under Imperfect Information, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1983); Steven Shavell, Liability
for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984); Steven Shavell, A Model of the
Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. ECON. 271 (1984); Pall Burrows,
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instrument should be used exclusively, Steven Shavell proposed four
indicators useful in determining the most effective instrument: the
availability of information about risky between private parties and an
administrative authority, the ability of private parties to compensate for
harm caused, the availability of legal action, and the administrative costs
incurred by private parities and by the public.22 When applying these
indicators to natural resources damage, neither regulation nor liability rules
are exclusively effective. For example, private parties may have better
information about risk, the influence of their activities on the environment,
and available loss reducing measures. Public regulatory schemes may be
less effective than liability rules, depending on the regulation's scope,
detail, and the availability of private information. 2 3 This is especially true of
command and control instruments, such as environmental standards and
environmental taxes.24 Incentive based instruments are unaffected by
availability of information, but carry significant implementation costs. 25
Compared to regulation, liability rules may have an information advantage,
but are ineffective if the liable parties are insolvent. Realistically, because
damages are often latent and parties are often indeterminate, the probability
of natural resources damages suits is low. 26 Considering these aspects of
regulation and liability rules, Shavell's model jointly utilizing both
regulation and tort principles is promising given the difficulties in
preventing natural resources damage.
Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
227 (1999); Patrick W. Schmitz, On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 20 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 371 (2000); Robert Innes, Enforcement Costs, Optimal Sanctions, and the Choice between Ex-
post Liability and Ex-ante Regulation, 24 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 29 (2004).
22 See Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, supra note 21, at 359-64.
23 To ensure that regulatory instruments work efficiently, public authorities need to know ex
ante to what extent potential victims may be hurt by a specific injury and how much it would cost a
potential injurer to avoid the injury. In comparison, under the tort system, judges do not need to know
this information beforehand. See Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental
Regulation?, 41 WASHBURN. L.J. 515, 524-28 (2002).
24 When large group of polluters are uniformly regulated, environmental standards may
disincentivize some polluters from taking necessary precautions, while over-incenitvizing others. "An
efficient Pigouvian tax needs to be set at a level equalizing marginal damage caused by the pollution and
marginal benefits resulting from its abatement." This is also difficult to satisfy. Peter Zweifel & Jean-
Robert Tyran, Environmental Impairment Liability as an Instrument of Environmental Policy, 11
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 43, 51 (1994).
25 Under incentive-based instruments, private parties have significant discretion regarding
pollution abatement. This makes accurate quantitative assessments of performance by the government
important. Assessment and monitoring are costly in many cases. Further, incentive-based instruments
may also create high governance costs. Kenneth Richard, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument
Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 221, 256-67 (2000).
26 Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation Between Civil Liability and Environmental
Regulation: An Analytical Overview, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 380-82 (2002).
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Legal scholars have extensively studied the role of liability and
regulation. Natural resources damage includes not only damage to private
natural resources but also damage to public natural resources. Public natural
resources are not owned by any individual, which creates problems for
compensating harm. Further, owners of private natural resources may only
be incentivized to bring a suit for recovery of economic value. Both in the
United States and in Europe, public authorities are granted standing in
natural resources damage actions.27 Public interest groups may also be
authorized to act on a subsidiary basis, increasing the likelihood that suits
for natural resources damage will be initiated. Such a policy was proposed
in the White Paper on Environmental Liability, but not adopted in the final
Directive.28 Many international conventions have adopted liability
channeling policies for pursuing bad actors, for example such policies have
been adopted to address damages in the nuclear energy and oil production
industries. 2 9 However, economic literature illustrates that such policies are
inefficient. Channeling leads to under deterrence of third parties who may
be equally responsible for damages by contribution to the activity's risk.t
27 Under both common law and federal legislations, public authorities have locus standi to
bring suit for natural resources damage. Before the passage of CERCLA, claims for natural resources
damage were brought under common law actions. The police power, public trust doctrine and the
doctrine of parens patriae can be used to grant the state standings to sue. Note that actions under
common law can still be utilized where statutes do not provide a remedy. Federal statutes largely
address the inadequacies of the common law and secure full compensation for natural resources damage.
Under both CERCLA and OPA, state government, the federal government, or government designees can
claim natural resource damages. See Allan Kanner & Mary E. Ziegler, Understanding and Protecting
Natural Resources, 17 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 119 (2006); Kathleen Chandler Schmid, The
Depletion of the Superfund and Natural Resource Damages, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 483 (2008). Under
the ELD, the competent authority designated by member states shall recover the costs of preventive or
remedial actions taken from the liable parties. See ELD, supra note 6, art. 8.
21 Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Environmental Liability, at 22,
COM (2000) 66 final (9 Feb. 2000) [hereinafter White Paper]. This approach is not accepted in the final
directive. According to the ELD, only "the competent authority shall recover, ... the cost it has incurred
in relation to the preventive or remedial actions taken under the Directive." Natural or legal persons are
only entitled to submit to the competent authority relevant observations and request the competent
authority to take action. They cannot personally claim environmental damage. ELD, supra note 6, art
8.2, 12.1, 14.2.
29 The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
channels liability to the owner of a tanker at the time of an incident or the first of a series of occurrences.
See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1992, art.
III, Misc 36 (1994), Cm 2657, RMC 1.7.51, 11.7.51 [hereinafter CLC 1992]. Under both the Paris
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage, the operator of a nuclear installation is exclusively liable for nuclear
damage. See Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy as amended by
the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, art. Ill, date, 956
U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Paris Convention 1982]; Vienna Convention as Amended by the Protocol of
12 September 1997 to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, art. II,
date, 1063 U.N.T.S. 358 [hereinafter Vienna Convention 1997].
3 See Michael Faure & Wang Hui, Economic Analysis of Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage, 37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 179, 187-89 (2006); Michael Faure & Tom Vanden Borre,
Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International
Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 219, 264-65 (2008); Evelyne Ameye,
Channeling of Nuclear Third Party Liability towards the Operator: Is It Sustainable in a Developing
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Economists deduce that where parties have equal access to information,
both strict liability and negligence rules can lead to efficient care levels, but
only strict liability can influence the injurers' activity level.I
In the context of natural resources damage, strict liability should
apply to damage created by environmentally hazardous activities, while
negligence rule should apply to others. Liability should not be retroactively
applied, as holding a party liable for past damage cause does not incentivize
prevention.32 Some scholars hold that retroactive liability even weakens
incentives to take precautions. 33 Neither joint and several liability nor
proportionate liability are effective when multiple tortfeasors collectively
cause natural resources damage.3 4 Caps on liability do not deter parties
from causing natural resources damage. Limiting liability may result in
only partial costs internalization and insufficiently incentivizes efficient
levels of care under a strict liability regime.35 While insurance can cure
some of these inefficiencies, note that caps may also be put on the duty to
seek the insurance coverage. 36
The combination of regulation and liability rules still cannot
guarantee optimal prevention and compensation of natural resource
damages. Both instruments focus on prevention, but ultimately neglect the
greater goal of compensation. Additionally, problems such as insolvency of
liable parties, asymmetry of information, and the low probability of natural
resources damage suits result in inefficient levels of deterrence. Given these
inefficiencies, additional compensation instruments are necessary to prevent
and compensate damage.
Academics and scholars have examined compensation instruments,37 and
compensation regimes have been implemented in various jurisdictions. For
Nuclear World or is there a Need for Liability of Nuclear Architects and Engineers?, 19 EUR. ENERGY &
ENVTL. L. REV. 33 (2010). Some scholars do not oppose the channeling of liability itself but the
combination of channeling and caps on liability. See Michael Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The
Economics of Nuclear Accident Law, 17 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 215, 216 (1997).
" Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 .1 LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1980).
32 Michael Faure, Environmental Liability, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 247, 261-62
(Michael Faure ed., 2009).
33 E.g., James Boyd & Howard Kunreuther, Retroactive Liability or the Public Purse, 11 J.
REG. EcoN. 79, 80 (1997).
34 See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Joint and Several Liability, in TORT LAW
AND ECONOMICS 130 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
3 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 177-79 (6th ed. 2003); Steven Shavell,
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 236 (2004).
36 Faure & Grimeaud, supra note 20, at 200-02.
3 James Boyd, Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding and
Assurance Rules Fulfilling their Promise?, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ISSUES IN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 417,417-85 (Timothy Swanson ed., 2002);
Hubert Bocken, Financial Guarantees in the Environmental Liability Directive: Next Time Better, 15
EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 13, 13-32 (2006); Hubert Bocken, Alternative Financial Guarantees
for Environmental Liability under the ELD, 18 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REv. 146, 146-70 (2009);
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example, in the United States, compensation instruments are incorporated
into statutes governing "financial responsibility."' 8 Similarly, ELD member
states are required to encourage the development of financial security
instruments. 3 9 This article examines several compensation instruments:
liability insurance, first-party and direct insurance, risk-sharing agreements,
environmental funds, other guarantees and the use of capital markets.
Economic analysis illustrates how those instruments can reduce social
costs. 40
III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPENSATION FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
DAMAGE
The definition and characteristics of natural resources damage may
influence the design of an optimal compensation system. Natural resources
damage is defined in this article to include damage to both public and
private natural resources, and includes any resource whose ecological value
might exceed its economic value. Ecological value is difficult to quantify.
Thus for natural resources that are more valuable ecologically than
economically, the most effective remedy is restoration, not monetary
compensation. Compensation instruments for natural resources damage are
best structured so as to finance and promote restoration, rather than merely
providing monetary compensation. Both the United States and European
counties adopt this restoration-based approach. The original United States
Department of the Interior assessment rules followed traditional common-
law standards, defining damages as "the lesser of restoration or replacement
costs or diminution of use value."41 The "less of' rule was later overruled
by Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior, which created a
presumption that restoration costs are the proper measure of recovery in
natural resources damage.4 2 The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration assessment rules supersede this judicial rule, further
emphasizing restoration.43 Under the ELD, operators are obligated to take
Michael Faure, A Shif Toward Alternative Compensation Mechanisms for Environmental Damage?, in
SHIFT IN COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 73, 73-102 (Michael Faure & Albert Verheij
eds., 2007).
3 E.g. 42 U.S.C. § 9608 (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (2012).
3 ELD, supra note 6, art. 14.
40 See CALABRESI, supra note 19, at 26-28 (defining "social costs").
4143 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2) (1987).
42 Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Congress established
a distinct preference for restoration cost[s] as the measure of recovery in natural resource damage
cases").
43 14 C.F.R. § 990.10 (2012); see Charles B. Anderson, Damage to Natural Resources and
the Costs of Restoration, 72 TUL. L. REV. 417, 467 (1997).
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remedial action and bear costs." The ELD Annex further emphasizes that
remediation of damage to water, protected species, and natural habitats "is
achieved through the restoration of the environment to its baseline
condition." 45 Despite these similarities, there are important differences
between American and European systems. The United States' system
differentiates between liability for cleanup costs and liability for restoring
natural resources. For example, under CERCLA the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for response actions when there is
a threatened release of hazardous materials, or when a threat of release
imminently and substantially endangers the public health or welfare.4 6 This
rule concerns public health and the environment, but does not guarantee
environmental restoration. Under CERCLA damage to natural resources
may continue even after response action is taken. The ELD does not
differentiate between clean up and restoration.4 7 However, under the ELD a
liable party is responsible for both immediate cleanup and full restoration.48
This distinction warrants further attention in comparing compensation
systems. For the purpose of this article, discussion of compensation models
and instruments should be read as including both cleanup costs and
restoration of natural resources.
Many different activities can result in natural resources damage.
Much attention is paid to industrial pollution, but in reality other activities
can also cause significant damage to natural resources. Under both
CERCLA and OPA, a release or substantial threat of release triggers
response action and liability.49  The ELD regime differs in that
contamination of land triggers restoration requirements, but both
contamination and non-contamination events trigger restoration
requirements for damage caused to protected species, natural habitats, and
water. 0 This distinction illustrates the divergent policies concerning
liability for clean up and damage. The U.S. system only regulates damage
4 ELD, supra note 6, art. 6, 8.
45 ELD, supra note 6, annex II.
46 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2012).
4 Bio Intelligence Serv., European Commission DG ENV: Study on the Implementation
Effectiveness of the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD) and Related Financial Security Issues 47
(2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/others/pdf/implementationefficiency.pdf
[hereinafter European Commission DG ENV].
4 Id at 48-49.
49 See 42 U.S.C § 9604, 9607; 33 U.S.C. § 2702.
" The ELD defines damage to protected species, natural habitats, and water according to the
extent and scope of resources damage. The ELD indentifies some activities (activities listed in Annex
Ill) as triggers of environmental damage. These activities include non-pollution events, such as "water
abstraction and impoundment of water subject to prior authorization in pursuance of Directive
2000/60/EC." ELD supra note 6, art. 2, annex 1II.
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caused by pollution, but neglects to regulate non-pollution. The ELD
established the same remedial criteria for damage caused by pollution and
non-pollution events. It is worth noting that the majority of existing
compensation instruments cover only pollution events, and non-pollution
52events are still largely unregulated in this area.
The third characteristic of natural resources damage concerns
emphasis on restoration. When natural resources damage or imminent threat
of damage occurs, measures should be taken to prevent further damage, not
simply to clean up and restore the area. Liable parties are usually the first to
know that damage or the threat of damage exists. They can thus take
immediate preventive and cleanup measures. However, liable parties do not
necessarily have the expertise to effectively restore the natural resource, or
may tend to externalize costs by taking insufficient restoration measures.53
Public environmental protection authorities or the trustee of specific natural
resources may have better information and expertise concerning certain
natural resources and proper restoration. Therefore, it is a common practice
for public authorities to intervene in environmental restoration.54 For
example, the ELD underwent a shift from a civil law to a public law
compensation scheme in its final stages. 5 The earlier White Paper
contained both a civil liability system and an administrative law system.56
However, in the final Directive, only the administrative law system
remained." Under the ELD, necessary preventive and remedial measures
s Id. annex III.
52 Id. There are several explanations for this, such as insurers' lack of experience concerning
environmental insurance policies, and the lack of public awareness that the ELD covers non-pollution
events.
5 See James Boyd, A Market-Based Analysis of Financial Insurance Issues Associated with
US Natural Resource Damage Liability, in DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY, AND COMPENSATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 261 (Michael Faure
ed., 2003).
54 Id at 266-67.
5 During the years of preparation that went into creating the ELD, discussion was largely
focused on a system of private law compensation. Commission Proposal for a Directive on Toxic and
Hazardous Waste, 1976 O.J. C 194/2; Council Directive 84/631/EEC, 1984 O.J. (L326) 31 (EC);
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, at 4,
COM (1989) 282 final (Oct. date, 1989). A civil law system with individual and collective
compensation mechanisms was discussed under the first Commission proposal on environmental
liability in the waste sector and the 1993 Green Paper on the restoration of environmental
damage. Commission Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (1993) 47 final (14
May 1993).
The White Paper differentiated between damage to biodiversity and the contamination of
sites and traditional damage. For traditional damage, a civil law scheme remains, but for damage to
biodiversity and contaminated land, an administrative law system was introduced. In the final Directive,
only the administrative system for environmental damage remained and traditional damage was
excluded from the application. See Gerd Winter et al., Weighing Up the EC Environmental Liability
Directive, 20 J. ENVTL. L. 163, 163-65 (2008).
16 Winter, supra note 55, at 164-65.
' Id. at 163-64.
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may be taken by the competent authority of the operator. 8 Similarly, under
CERCLA the EPA is authorized to take response actions. 5 9 The EPA can
also allow responsible parties to take specified procedural actions.60 Natural
resources trustees (federal or state trustees, and Indian tribes) are
responsible for assessing any natural resources damage not recovered
according to the response actions.6 1
The U.S. chose these administrative procedures as opposed to a
pure civil liability regime. A mix of administrative and civil elements may
influence the operation of compensation instruments, and requires
cooperation between public authorities and the providers of compensation
instruments. For example, many compensation instruments, such as liability
insurance and risk-sharing agreements cover liability created by the
policyholders. 62 "Liability," however, is to a large extent determined by
public administrative procedures. There may be divergences between the
coverage conditions of those instruments and the "liability" determined
under administrative decisions or in the courts. Thus it may be desirable to
involve providers in some administrative procedures, for example in
providing guidance on the assessment of natural resources damage. The
cooperation between public authorities, liable parties, and providers of
compensation instruments (such as insurers) is also beneficial to quantify
natural resources damage and to implement restoration plans.
Another issue worth noting is that an environmentally harmful
activity usually does not create natural resources damage alone. Natural
resources damage is often accompanied by personal injuries and property
damage. In these situations, the injurers face liability not only for natural
resources damage, but also for relevant traditional damage. For example,
CERCLA and OPA holds firms liable for natural resources damage, as well
as for all response costs, personal injury and property damage, and lost
government revenue.63 Identified firms are required to provide financial
responsibility for all these liabilities, instead of exclusively for natural
64resources damage. Many compensation instruments are hence designed to
comprehensively compensate for damages beyond natural resources
damage. When a specific instrument is analyzed, attention needs to be paid
5 ELD, supra note 6, art. 5, 6.
' 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (2012).
60 id.
6' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2012).
62 Boyd, supra note 53, at 279-80.
63 See id. at 259.
6 See id at 281.
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to its coverage: whether it covers only natural resources damage or also
traditional damage.
IV. PROPOSED MODELS TO PREVENT AND COMPENSATE FOR NATURAL
RESOURCES DAMAGE
A. Compensation, liability rules, and insolvency
The section will discuss models that provide efficient deterrent
incentives to potential injurers, and promote compensation (restoration) of
the damaged environment. Regulation, liability rules, and compensation
instruments can be combined to achieve this goal.
1. Creating Damage At Various Stages
Before examining the respective roles of regulation, liability rules,
and compensation instruments, we briefly discuss when and how natural
resources damage occurs. An environmentally harmful activity can create
environmental risks during its construction, operation, and even in the post
closure phrase. Regulation is the primary instrument used before the
operation stage. Before the start of a new project, the operator may need to
apply for a license. Considering the potential environmental impacts of the
project, an environmental impact assessment may be required. Such
regulation mainly aims to prevent the creation of pollution, as often the
project developer is required to account for potential environmental impacts
of their activity, and if necessary take preventive actions. 65 Even with such
regulatory requirements, project construction may still create natural
resources damage. Some regulations even go so far as to ask for
compensation for such potential damage at the beginning of the project.
One example is the Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural
Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora (Habitats Directive).6 6 The Habitat
Directive requires member states to take compensatory measures to ensure
the environmental protection and overall coherence when a project is
justified for overriding public interest but negatively impacts the
environment. 67  The Commission published a non-binding guidance
document on this issue.68 According to this document, "compensatory
65 See Council Directive 85/337/EEC, on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and
Private Projects on the Environment, preamble & art. 5, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40, 42.
66 Council Directive 92/43/EEC, of the Council of the European Communities of 21 May
1992 on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1992 O.J. (L 206).
61 Id. at 11.
6 Commission Guidance Document on Article 6(4) of the 'Habitats Directive' 92/43/EEC:
Clarification of the Concepts of Alternative Solutions, Imperative Reasons of Overriding Public Interest,
Compensatory Measures, Overall Coherence, Opinion of the Commission, (Jan. 2007), available at
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measures" need to be independent of the project, 69 and the measures consist
of restoration or enhancement in existing sites, habitat recreation, and
proposing a new site under the Habitats and Birds Directive.70 This
explanation shows that the term "compensatory measures" has similar
implication as remedial actions under the ELD. 7' During the design and
construction stages of an environmental harmful activity, the prevention
and compensation of natural resources is mainly achieved through
regulation, not liability rules.
After the construction of a facility or initiation of a project, natural
resources damage may be created during operation. Regulation can also be
used in this stage to ensure that operators/other relevant parties take care to
prevent damage. Both command-and-control methods and market-based
instruments can be used. Though these instruments can internalize costs and
incentivize heightened care, information problems often prevent regulation
from creating truly efficient deterrent incentives. Thus liability rules can
complement regulation. Holding a party liable imposes on him a heightened
obligation to restore the damaged environment. However, because operators
may prove insolvent, these liability rules themselves cannot guarantee
compensation. Further, it can be difficult to identify liable parties. These
common problems make the development of compensation instruments
increasingly desirable.
Firstly, when the liable party cannot be identified or other elements
make establishing liability difficult, collective compensation mechanisms
(such as environmental funds) can be used to finance restoration of the
damaged environment.72 Secondly, potentially liable parties may employ
various compensation instruments, such as liability insurance, risk-sharing
agreements, and self-provided or third party provided guarantees. 73 During
operation both government and potentially liable parties may take various
measures to insure against liability and regulate activities to minimize risk
of damage.
Some industrial facilities may continue to pose environmental risks
even during and after the closure of such facilities. For example, after the
useful life of a nuclear power plant expires, the remaining radioactive
substances and the facility itself continues to pose substantial risk for
human beings and for the environment. It is widely accepted that a
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/art6/guidance art6_4
en.pdf. 69 Id. at 10.
"' Id. at 14.
7 ELD, supra note 6, art. 2(11).
72 See infra Part V.A.
73 Id.
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decommissioning is required after the shutdown of the plant. 74 Even after
the decommissioning stage, monitoring may still be required for a very long
time. This is also the case for some hazardous chemical industry.75 Proper
closure and post-closure monitoring are important requirements for certain
industrial activities. Additionally, a facility may still create natural
resources damage after closure, and compensation instruments may be used
to internalization costs. However, given the uncertainties brought by the
long tail nature of the damage, the availability for corresponding
compensation instruments is still low in practice.7 6 Sometimes, to ensure
the availability of financial assets to cover natural resources damage caused
during the operation or after closure, potentially liable parties are required
to provide financial security. Environmental costs related to liability are
uncertain, and hence additional assurance is necessary. The requirements of
closure and post-closure monitoring are more defined, but may also require
financial assurance. A detailed discuss of the interaction between
regulation, liability rules and compensation instruments in all the three
stages of activities is beyond the scope of this article. This research focuses
on compensation models for natural resources damage created during the
operation of a plant.
74 E.g., an E.U. commission recommendation was passed in 2006 to address the
decommissioning of nuclear installations. According to this recommendation, all nuclear installations
should be decommissioned after permanent shutdown, and the "-polluter pays" principle should be
applied throughout the decommissioning. See Commission Recommendation of24 October 2006 on the
Management ofFinancial Resources for the Decommissioning ofNuclear Installations, Spent Fuel and
Radioactive Waste, § 3, 2006/85 1/Euratom, Oct. 24, 2006. In spite of the wide acceptance of the
"polluter pays" principle in guidance materials, it is not fully implemented. Only European countries
such as Finland, Sweden, require nuclear operators to finance decommissioning. Comparison among
Different Decommissioning Funds Methodologies for Nuclear Installations, Final Report, at 12 (2007),
available at http://www.wupperinst.org/uploads/tx-wiprojekt/EUDecommFundsFinalReport.pdf. In
the U.S., submission of a decommissioning plan or License Termination Plan is a condition of nuclear
license termination. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1403 (2012).
7 E.g., under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 operators of hazardous
waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities are required to ensure proper closure and take post
closure care. The standards for closure and post closure are codified. 40 C.F.R. § 264.110-.120, §
265.110-.121 (2012).
76 E.g., a post-closure liability trust fund was established under CERCLA initially. When
satisfying a few identified requirements, the operator of a closed hazardous waste disposal facility can
transfer his liability to the fund. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2) (2012). The fund was designed to consist of
such amount as may be appropriated, credited, or transferred to it. See Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, §232, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
Transfer of liability to the fund was later suspended, and according to a General Accounting Office
report prepared in 1990, the suspension of the transfer of liability to the fund was due to the
insufficiency of the fund. Since there were little instruments available to cover the post-closure
liabilities by then, it is argued that a decision on post-closure liabilities should be made after more data
and experiences were available. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-90-64,
HAZARDOUS WASTE: FUNDING OF POSTCLOSURE LIABILITIES REMAINS UNCERTAIN (1990) available at
http://archive.gao.gov/d24t8/141474.pdf.
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2. Mandatory financial security
(a) Theory
Various scholars propose imposition of financial requirements on
specific environmentally harmful enterprises. For example, Alberto Monti
proposed an institutional model incorporating regulation, liability, funds
and insurance in response to environmental harm. 7 According to his model,
an enterprise wanting to enter or remain on the market must satisfy certain
financial requirements.7 8 Compliance with these requirements can be
achieved by adoption of several financial products, including environmental
insurance.79 Mandatory financial security was also proposed by the
Interuniversity Commission for the revision of environmental law in the
Flemish region in 1995 (Draft Decree on Environmental Policy).80
According to Part Nine of this Draft Decree, the permit-holder or holder of
a notification certificate of the classified installations and activities
designated by Flemish government is bound to provide financial guarantees
where liable for damage to or impairment of the environment.8 ' Under this
policy there is no general duty of financial security on all the classified
82installations. Instead, the government or the administrative authorities
determine the requirement type and amount of financial security.83 A
variety of compensation instruments can be used to satisfy the financial
security requirement, including: an insurance policy, a guarantee provided
by a financial institution, any other form of personal or collateral security
and a deposit. Introduction of a mandatory financial responsibility system is
widely favored by many scholars.84 Literature shows that financial
7 Alberto Monti, Environmental Risk: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach to
Liability and Insurance, 9. EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 51 (2001).
" See id.
7 See id.
so H. Bocken et al., The Flemish Draft Decree on Environmental Policy: An Outline, in THE
CODIFICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 31-32




84 Many other scholars are also in favor of a system with financial responsibility, though they
may differ in the concrete design of regimes. E.g., Kehne mentioned the advantages of a financial
responsibility system with respect to both deterrence and compensation. He also indentified the conflicts
between these goals and tried to come up with a system (mainly insurance policies) that can balance
those goals. See Jeffrey Kehne, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial
Responsibility for Hazardous Waste, 96 YALE L.J. 403 (1986). Feess and Hege favored a financial
responsibility system consisting of both insurance and lender guarantees rather than pure strict liability
and extending liability. See Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege, Environmental Harm and Financial
Responsibility, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 220 (2000); Boyer and Porrini focused on proposing
a model with efficient interactions and liability sharing between governments, firms and insurance
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responsibility plays an integral role in promoting deterrence and
compensation, and saving administrative costs.85
A financial responsibility system can strengthen the deterrent
effects of liability rules and supplement regulatory standards.86 It is well
established that insolvency risks results in inefficient deterrence under strict
liability regimes.87 Environmental accidents are often followed by a high
magnitude of claims from victims and expensive restoration, greatly
reducing a firm's wealth. Given this reality, firms must demonstrate the
availability of assets to cover potential liability to alleviate insolvency
risks. 8 Law and economic literature supports the use of other instruments,
especially extended liability, to resolve insolvency problems.89 Extended
liability holds third parties contractually connected with the directly liable
party liable.90 Other literature proposes that managers should additionally
be held liable where corporations are undercapitalized. 91 Further, literature
also suggests that a firm's lenders should be held liability for natural
resources damage.92 While extending liability reduces insolvency risks,
some scholars argue that financial responsibility is preferable to extended
liability since the latter does not guarantee costs internalization and can
distort production decisions. 93 A detailed analysis of and a comparison
between extended liability and financial responsibility is beyond the scope
of this article. This research focuses on whether financial responsibility is
companies. See Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor for
Environmental Disasters: Lessons for Optimal Insurance Regulation, 33 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK &
INS. 337 (2008). Kambia-Chopin analyzed financial responsibility from the perspective to solve the
judgment-proof problem. Instead of the traditional insurance policies, he favored a particular form of
contract which is close to an alternative risk transfer product. See Bid6nam Kambia-Chopin,
Environmental Risks, the Judgment-ProofProblem and Financial Responsibility, 30 EUR. J. L. & ECON.
77(2010).
85 id.
86 Kehne, supra note 84, at 403.
8 See John Summers, The Case of the Disappearing Defendant: An Economic Analysis, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 145, 155 (1983); Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L. REV. L. &
ECON. 45, 45 (1986).
88 Kambia-Chopin, supra note 84, at 78.
89 Id.
9o Feess & Hege, supra note 84, at 220.
9' See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls,
93 YALE L.J. 857, 872-77 (1984).
92 See Dieter Balkenborg, Comment, How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of
Judgment-ProofFirms and Environmental Risk, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 731 (2001); Marcel Boyer & Jean-
Jacques Laffont, Environmental Risks and Bank Liability, 41 EUR. ECON. REV. 1427 (1997); Georges
Dionne & Sandrine Spaeter, Environmental Risk and Extended Liability: The Case of Green
Technologies, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1025 (2003); Emma Hutchison & Klaas Van't Veld, Extended Liability
fbr Environmental Accidents: What You See Is What You Get, 49 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 157
(2005); Rohan Pitchford, How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and
Environmental Risk, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1171 (1995).
9 See Boyd, supra note 37, at 424-25; Feess & Hege, supra note 85, at 222.
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necessary and how it should be arranged to promote the prevention and
compensation of natural resources damage.
Another advantage of financial responsibility is that firms are then
more likely to monitor activities, inducing efficient care. Financial
responsibility establishes a principal-agent relationship between the
assurance providers and the firm engaged in environmentally risky
activities.9 4 The principal is paid a fee, and in return bears the risk of
liability for natural resources damage.95 Under such an arrangement, the
principal has strong incentives to monitor the environmental safety of the
96
agents. Through regulatory instruments, public authorities can also
monitor and influence a firm's activity. However, financial responsibility
also has added value. It both induces private party involvement and
encourages firms to seek additional information about hazardous activities.
Further, if the environmental risk is long-term there is an added incentive
for intervention of insurers and other assurance providers. Assurance
providers have more incentives to assess risks accurately to operate
profitably, as compared to regulators who are more likely to be influenced
by powerful political constituencies.97
Financial responsibility can also promote timely, low-cost public
access to compensation.9 8 Alleviation of insolvency risks provides a certain
level of guarantee for the availability of assets in case of damage.
Assurance may also save administrative costs. Delay and great information
requirements of rulemaking procedures are obstacles to the specificity and
adaptability of regulatory standards. In a competitive market, assurance
providers have strong incentives to control administrative costs and can
amend the policy conditions more easily and cheaply. 99
(b) Practice
Financial responsibility is favored by scholars in academic
literature, and has been practically adopted in many countries. U.S. statutes
provide many illustrations. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), the owners and operators of underground petroleum storage
tanks are required to demonstrate their ability to restore a contaminated site
and compensate for property damage or injury arising from a leaking
9 Kehne, supra note 84, at 408.
9 See Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship,
10 BELL J. EcON. 55, 55 (1979).
96 Boyd, supra note 37, at 423.
9 Kehne, supra note 84, at 410-11.
9 See Boyd, supra note 37, at 423-24.
9 Kehne, supra note 84, at 411-12.
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tank."oo OPA and CERCLA incorporate a financial assurance rule
governing vessels carrying oil or hazardous substances.' 0 Financial
responsibility provisions are pervasive throughout environmental law and
regulation.
The financial capacity of the operators creating environmental risks
should be taken into consideration. The financial capacities of insurers and
other assurance providers are also material. When a financial requirement is
imposed, ceilings should be set to ensure that the regulation is not unduly
oppressive to operators. Financial liability caps are usually stipulated in
legislation, based on some rough differentiation such as the type and size of
operations.102 In some cases, ceilings can be determined on a case-by-case
basis, considering the specific risks posed by an operation. In other words,
the ceiling is decided according to specific procedural requirements and
established estimation methodologies. 103  Case-by-case evaluation and
established methodologies can better account for risk differentiation,
promoting more efficient deterrence as compared to a limit on liability.
Theoretical advantages do not necessarily make mandatory
financial security feasible in practice. Whether an enterprise will seek a
certain level of financial security depends not only on their incentives and
obligations to do so, but also on the capacity and willingness of the market
to provide security.104 Markets may be immature, providers inexperienced,
or providers may consider environmental liability too unpredictable to
cover. If markets are unwilling to provide security, it becomes meaningless
to impose obligations on operators to seek the coverage. An interesting
example is the German Environmental Liability Act of 1990, which
obligated owners of environmentally risky operations to seek liability
insurance or to comparable financial guarantees. 05 Note that this clause
00o 40 C.F.R. § 280.93 (2012).
.o' 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012). The financial assurance rule is
implemented by 33 C.F.R. § 138 (2012).
102 For example, the OPA imposes different levels of limits of liability on responsible parties.
The differentiation of these levels is based on the types and size of installations: the tank vessels, other
vessels, offshore facilities and deepwater ports. The limitation of liability for tank vessels is further
differentiated according to the size. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2012). In 2006, the limitation of vessels was
increased and a third criterion was introduced to differentiate the risks created by tank vessels: the
structure of tankers. Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-241,120
Stat. 516 (2006). The use of double hull tankers is preferable to single hull tanker, and hence is less
limited. However, the statutory differentiation is still rough and not tailored to specific conditions.
i03 An example of the latter is that some states in the US require hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities to estimate the costs required to close the facility, based on which the
financial requirement is determined. The estimate is based on a routinized methodology, which typically
involves the use of standard software and worksheets associated with specific cost categories. Boyd,
supra note 37, at 442-43.
104 Faure, supra note 84, at 159.
105 Umwelthaftungsgesetz [UmweltHG] [Environmental Liability Act], Dec. 10, 1990,
BGBL. I at 2634 (Ger.), translated in FOREIGN L. TRANSLATIONS,
http://www.utexas.edu/laws/academics/centers/transnational/worknew/german/case.php?id=1396 (last
visited Apr. 5, 2012).
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was proposed and incorporated into the Act, but has not yet been
implemented. 106
Another example is the financial security clause included in the
ELD.10 7 During the preparation of the Directive, a lot of attention was paid
to the issue of financial security. The White Paper states, "availability of
financial security, such as insurance, is therefore important to ensure that
liability is environmentally effective."os Considering the lack of experience
and immature nature of the market, the White Paper states, "the EC regime
should not impose an obligation to have financial security, in order to allow
the necessary flexibility." 0 This approach is followed in the Directive.o
The ELD itself does not introduce a mandatory financial security
requirement, but rather requires member states to take measures toward use
and development of financial security instruments."' The Directive requires
the Commission to report on the effectiveness of the Directive and financial
security issues, most recently published in October 2010.112 This latest
report found that member states have differing attitudes concerning the
financial security systems incorporated into the ELD.113 Only a few
countries have opted for mandatory financial security, but systems have not
yet been implemented.1 14 The report finds it premature for the Commission
to propose mandatory financial security on all European Union member
states."' In addition, it requires the option of mandatory financial security
be re-examined before 2014.116
Compulsory insurance has various limits. These limits include risk
of moral hazard, limited willingness of insurers to insure environmentally
risky activities, and the limited willingness, availability and
106 See Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 293, 317 (2002); Marsh Ltd., New Environmental Liabilities for EU Companies,
MARSH, INC. SERVICES (2009), available at
http://global.marsh.com/documents/NewEnvironmentalliabilitiesforEUcompaniesvl0.pdf.
107 ELD, supra note 6, art. 14.
10 See White Paper, supra note 28, § 3.6.
109 Id. § 4.9.
110 Id.
1 ELD, supra note 6, art. 14.
112 Id.
" Id.
114 Report from the Commission to the Council, Under Article 14 (2) of Directive
2004/35/CE on the Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of
Environmental Damage, §4.1.1 (Oct. 12, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/com 2010 0581.pdf.
1'5 Id.
116 Id. § 4.2.
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competitiveness of the insurance market itself."' Compared to compulsory
insurance, a system of compulsory financial security is more flexible
because different instruments can be developed to cover the liability."'
However, the limits of compulsory insurance may also limit compulsory
financial security in certain situations. For example, if the insurance market
is uncompetitive and alternative liability-reducing instruments are
unavailable, mandating financial security will be ineffective." 9 If every
operator is obliged to seek financial coverage, and if there is little
competition among providers, quality of the financial securities will
decrease and prices will increase given the scarcity. Alternatively,
imposition of mandatory financial security in a mature and competitive
market will lead to efficient outcomes. Where markets are not competitive,
a voluntary financial security scheme is more desirable than a mandatory
financial security scheme.
In addition to financial security covering liability and collective
instruments covering residential natural resources damage, there are also
instruments providing compensation irrespective of liability. Direct
insurance and some environmental funds are such examples. Direct
insurance is favored by site owners, as these policies can cover both
damage on the insured site and the damage suffered by third parties
resulting from that particular site. An accurate description of the insured
risk is of great importance for this compensation instrument. Because
restoration requirements are largely controlled by public authorities, and
because coverage is defined in the insurance contract, the compatibility of
direct insurance and administrative procedures deserves much attention.
Another instrument that can provide coverage for natural resources damage,
no matter whether liability is established or not, is an environmental fund.
A variety of environmental funds exist, some based on liability and others
irrespective of liability. Environmental funds should be used with caution,
considering the disadvantages of funds as compared with insurance
regarding difficulties in risk differentiation, controlling moral hazard, and
reducing tertiary costs.120
11 Faure, supra note 84, at 157-62.
" Id.
19 Liability insurance is an oft-used instrument to help potential injurers to cover their
liability. Other alternatives may be desirable in certain situations, but these often have limited
application. For example, a risk sharing agreement is a useful instrument when operators have better
information on risks than insurers and can effectively monitor each other. Captive insurance may suit
some sectors such as the nuclear, where enterprises have sufficient capacity, but is not available for
small chemical plants because of a lack of capacity. See 43 AM. JUR. 2DInsurance §716-718 (2003);
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 871, 873 (9th ed. 2009); Faure & Grimeaud, supra note 20, at 229-31.
120 Insurers are usually more specialized in risk differentiation and risk spreading. If the
insurance markets are competitive, the insurers have incentives to control the problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection better than funds. The government agency, as the administrator of a compensation
fund does not usually have incentives to do so. Insurance policies are drafted to include a whole set or
risks; competitive pressures can force the administrative structure to be cost-effective. Compensation
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B. Models Of Compensation
This article presents three models of compensation, incorporating a
combination of the above discussed compensation instruments. The models
are distinguished based on whether financial security is mandated. These
models illustrate that different strategies are necessary, based on whether or
not the liable party can or cannot be identified. Additionally, different
approaches are necessary dependent upon whether financial coverage can
be required. These models were developed based on theoretical economic
principles, but each of these models has been actually implemented in legal
systems as discussed below.
fund does not have these features. See Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief, Compensation Funds Versus
Liability and Insurance for Remedying Environmental Damage, 5 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L
ENVTL. L. 321 (1996).
282
COMPENSATION FOR NAT. RESOUR. DAMAGE






Upper of liable parties'
assets (changeable) in
case of damage and







* Compensation instruments to fulfill the financial requirement
* Personal liability born by liable parties themselves (maybe zero if the
liable parties' assets in case of damage are less than the ceiling)
Collective compensation instruments
Compensation instruments irrespective of liability
In a mature and competitive market, financial requirements should
be imposed on specified parties before operations begin. A ceiling should
be set for the financial requirement, as no market is able to provide
unlimited coverage. It is imperative that the efficient amount of coverage be
determined. James Boyd argues that optimal coverage should be just
enough to internalize future liabilities.121 Coverage beyond this level ties up
capital and is wasteful, while coverage below this level leads results in
121 See Boyd, supra note 37, at 441-42.
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externalities and under-deterrence.122 He further clarifies this level to be the
maximum of realistic environmental costs.123 This theoretically sound
requirement, however, is difficult to satisfy in practice. It is difficult to
estimate environmental costs, as variables including the scope of damage,
costs of restoration, climate change, hydrology, and geology are all
uncertain. Given the uncertainty, financial requirements are often deemed
insufficient natural resources damage compensation instruments. For
example, in the U.S. under the Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act
(SMCRA), first enacted in the 1970s, mining bonds are required to cover
reclamation costs.12 4 Despite improvements to bonding requirements over
the years, bonds are not always sufficient to cover the full cost of
reclamation. 2 5 Similar financial requirements also exist in the area of
nuclear damage and oil pollution regulation.126 Given difficulties in
estimating potential environmental costs, this article does not identify the
reasonable amount of financial responsibility. Instead, the article focuses on
who can best determine financial responsibility ceilings, and how the
ceiling should be determined.
Three approaches can be used to determine the ceiling of financial
responsibility. The ceiling can be determined either on a case-by-case basis,
via established estimation methodologies, or according to a relatively fixed
122 Id.
I23 Id.
124 30 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012).
125 Boyd, supra note 37, at 445.
126 E.g., the Price-Anderson Act (hereinafter PAA) determines the cap of the financial
guarantee of the nuclear power plants. The limit has increased from $ 560 million to $ 12.2 billion since
the enforcement of the PAA. This amount is also higher compared to the requirement in other
jurisdictions. In spite of the uncertainty in estimating the potential damage caused by a nuclear accident,
the caps in liability and the corresponding financial guarantees have long been criticized as a subsidy to
the nuclear industry. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, NUREG-0957, THE PRICE-ANDERSON
ACT- THE THIRD DECADE: REPORT TO CONGRESS (1983) available at
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0727/ML072760026.pdf; Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act:
Model Compensation Legislation? -The Sixty-Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1 (1989); Jeffrey Dubin & Geoffrey Rothwell, Subsidy to Nuclear Power through Price-Anderson
Liability Limit, 8 CONTEMP. POL. ISSUES 73 (1990); ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FEDERAL ENERGY
SUBSIDIES: DIRECT AND INDIRECT INTERVENTIONS IN ENERGY MARKETS (1992), available at
ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/service/emeu9202.pdf. This is also true for financial requirements under OPA,
which imposes limited liability and financial responsibility on tank vessels and offshore facilities. Until
2009, the financial requirement for tankers is the greater of $3200 per gross ton or $22 million. For
offshore facilities the requirement is no more than $150 million. However, the Deepwater Horizon
explosion in April of 2010 largely dwarfed the prescribed liability limit and financial requirements. The
released oil from the drilling platform is estimated at approximately 206 million gallons before its
containment on July 15, 2010. Though there is no official estimation of total costs yet, it is reasonably
regarded to be far more than the liability limit. To date the administration has sent eleven bills to
responsible parties for the removal costs, totaling $ totaling $711.8 million dollars. See RESTORE THE
GULF, http://www.restorethegulf.gov (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
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industry-wide "schedule." 27 Under the first approach, the ceiling can be
tailored to the specific risk an operation creates. Tailoring promotes better
risk differentiation and cost internalization. However, individual
determinations create high information and enforcement costs, and these
costs may outweigh the benefits. Established methodologies can also be
used to determine the ceiling. For example, in some U.S. states "hazardous
waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities" are required to prepare an
estimate of costs to close the facility on the basis of a routine
methodology.128 Standard software and "worksheets" associated with
specific cost categories are utilized.129 This approach allows for a variety of
costs estimations, and saves administrative costs as compared to the case-
by-case approach. The third approach is used most frequently. The financial
responsibility for vessels carrying oil and hazardous substances are
determined according to a fixed "schedule" under OPA and CERCLA.130
For example, the OPA requires responsible parties for an indentified vessel
to establish and maintain evidence of financial responsibility to meet the
maximum amount of liability.13' This method ensures that the responsible
party is solvent enough to compensate for any natural resources damages
should damage occur. This third methodology is a sort of middle ground, as
it is somewhat tailored to the specific activity, but only to an extent. The
administration and enforcement costs are not as extreme as in the case-by-
case method, but at the same time is more tailored than the second
approach.
Additionally, three approaches may be used in determining who has
the right to set the ceiling. The ceiling can be stipulated to by statutes, the
government can be authorized to decide the ceiling for specified operators
on a case-by-case basis, or a third possibility is to allow operators to
estimate their own costs and set a ceiling accordingly, then seeking
government or third-party approval.
The financial responsibility regime established under CERCLA
illustrates this first category. CERCLA imposes financial responsibility on
the owner or operator of vessels over three hundred gross tons using any
port in the United States, navigable waters, or any offshore facility. 32
CERCLA sets a ceiling of either $300 per gross ton or $5,000,000,
whichever amount is greater.'33 By statutorily prescribing a financial
127 Boyd, supra note 37, at 442-43.
128 Id.
29 Id. at 443.
30 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2012). Under CERCLA, the owners or operators of all vessels over
three hundred gross tons are required to provide evidence of financial responsibility with the same
criteria; the greater of $ 300 per gross ton or $ 5 million per vessel. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(a) (2012).
" 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2012).
132 42 U.S.C. § 9608(a) (2012).
' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (2012).
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requirement ceiling risks become more predictable for both operators and
for the financial market as a whole. This approach results in fewer
administrative costs, as ceilings are set according to a fixed schedule, not on
a case-by-case basis. However, statutorily established ceilings suffer from
the same disadvantages as limited liability. The financial requirements for
operators are not tailored to individual characteristics and needs, and
because financial requirements are based on general factors inefficiencies
may result.
The second solution is to authorize government to set financial
security that is somewhat tailored to a party based on information provided
by that party. Under such a scheme, the statute classifies certain activities
for which the actors must provide financial security. It is then up to the
government to decide which specific parties and to what extent proof of
financial security is necessary. This scheme is advantageous in that
government can tailor the ceiling for each party to satisfy specific
conditions, including the type and size of installations, locations, potential
risks, and preventive measures. However the advantage is only realized
where government is capable of differentiating parties where accurate
information is available. Further, ceilings may be inefficiently set where
lobbying groups influence government decision-making. This is especially
true for developing countries that lack reliable administrations, but is also a
challenge for developed countries.134 The limited governance capacities,
corruption and external influences are several usual problems perplexing
developing countries.135 The standard-based model provides additional
discretionary powers to the environmental regulatory authority, but
discretion without a solid and reliable administrative structure is risky, and
abuses more prevalent. On the contrary, a rule-based system concentrates
more power at the legislative or executive level, limiting the power of civil
servants (who often have greater expertise) to execute precise rules. 136 In a
country with an unreliable administrative structure it is advisable to set
minimal statutory financial requirements. However, it may be beneficial to
allow for some flexibility by allowing governments to ask for greater
financial security when appropriate for a specific party. Under such a
regime, minimal financial coverage is guaranteed and at the same time
flexible enough to set more efficient standards when necessary. This is
advantageous for developing countries, but is an effective regime for setting
financial ceilings in developed countries. With a combination of legislative
134 Michael Faure, Morag Goodwin & Franziska Weber, Bucking the Kuznets Curve:





1 Id. at 110-11.
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and administrative determination, greater costs saving and risk
differentiation can be achieved. One example is the setting of financial
responsibility for offshore facilities under OPA. 137 Generally speaking, the
amount of financial responsibility required from offshore facilities is $35
million for a facility located seaward and $10 million for a facility located
landward.' 8 However, the legislation makes exceptions, allowing the
President to determine amounts in excess of the required amount but no
more than $150 million if a higher amount is justifiable given the relative
operational, environmental, human health, and other risks. 139
One illustration of the third category is the financial responsibility
provisions included in RCRA. 14( RCRA requires owners and operators of a
treatment, storage, and disposal facility (TSDF) to demonstrate two forms
of financial responsibility: for the costs of closing the facilities and
maintaining post-closure care, and for bodily injury and property damage to
third parties. 141 Financial responsibility for closure and post-closure care is
determined by the estimates provided by owners and operators themselves,
but third party damages are specified in regulations. 14 2 Individual TSDFs
may have better information about their own safety status, potential risks,
and preventive measures. Thus theoretically the individual TSDF operators
can more accurately estimate costs and establish efficient financial ceilings.
Realistically, relying on self-estimates alone can easily lead to inadequate
coverage levels, as owners and operators tend to minimize their costs of
assurance. Hence information provided by operators suffers from moral
hazard problems. This approach provides sufficient coverage levels only if
public authorities conduct frequent, highly critical reviews of closed
plans.143 The U.S. EPA Region IV found that costs evaluated for closure
and post-closured care are chronically underestimated.1 " To address this
underestimation, EPA Region IV developed a manual establishing
evaluation methods and software to guide owners and operators in costs
estimation. 145 In a memorandum to RCRA Waste Management Division
Directors, the importance of review of cost estimates and financial
assurance instruments is emphasized. 146
" 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (2012).
. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(1)(B) (2012).
3933 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(1)(C) (2012).
140 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (2012).
14' 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.142-.145, .147 (2011); 40 C.F.R. §§ 265.142-145, .147. (2011).
142 Id.
143 Kehne, supra note 84, at 417.
'" U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RCRA FINANCIAL ASSURANCE FOR CLOSURE AND POST-
CLOSURE 46 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/200 1/finalreport330.pdf.
145 Id. at 46-47.
146 Memorandum from Matthew Hale, Director, Office of Solid Waste, U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, on Review of Financial Assurance Information When a RCRA Permit is Issued, Renewed, or
Reviewed to RCRA Waste Management Division Directors (Jan. 30, 2007), available at
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The traditional instrument used to establish financial responsibility
is liability insurance. Law and economic literature provides that insurance
is advantageous in that it flattens out risk. 147 The risk-averse operator can
instead pay insurance premiums, thus the risk of a catastrophic event
resulting in natural resources damages is shifted to the insurance
company.148 Where insurance policies are sold in a competitive market,
they will be are priced effectively. 149 However, this is only accurate if one
assumes that insurers are capable of monitoring the insured party's activity,
that accidents are unilateral, that there are no administrative costs, and that
no errors or uncertainty exists as to legal outcomes.o This is rarely if ever
the case. When these assumptions are relaxed, as realistically them must be,
liability insurance alone is less attractive, and alternative instruments may
be used to satisfy financial requirements. The operator can choose among
the various alternative instruments discussed above, which include liability
insurance, direct insurance, risk-sharing agreements, environmental funds,
and self-provided or third party provided guarantees. These alternative
instruments alleviate some of the problems related to insurability, and
induce capital market involvement in the internalization of environmental
costs. '5  The use of various instruments allows greater flexibility and
competition. Competition gives providers incentive to promote the
efficiency of their products and to reduce loading costs.
Collective compensation instruments are effective when liability is
unclear, or when the financial coverage sought is insufficient to cover the
damage and the injurer is insolvent. When collective instruments are used,
it is essential to make polluters finance instruments, thus creating additional
deterrent incentives.
The above table illustrates that the threshold of collective
compensation instruments in case of insolvency lies in the ceiling of the
financial requirement or the assets of the liable party when damage occurs-
whichever is larger. The ceiling may be specified in legislation or by the
government. The only possibility an operator has to shift the burden of
compensation through collective compensation instruments is to establish
smaller companies and to use limited liability entities.
http://yosemite.epa.gov/osw/rcra.nsf/0c994248c239947e85256d090071175f/2BD455873BAF7F6B8525
72A7006B8023/$file/14765.pdf.
147 See Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. EcoN. 120 (1982).
148 Id.
149 Id.
0 Id. at 131.
'5' Boyer & Porrini, supra note 84, at 344.
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Upper of liable parties'








Compensation instruments voluntarily taken by liable parties
Personal liability born by liable parties themselves (maybe zero if the
liable parties' assets in case of damage are less than the amount of
financial security taken voluntarily)
D- Collective compensation instruments
- -I Compensation instruments irrespective of liability
Where the market providing financial products for natural resources
damage is immature or uncompetitive, voluntary financial security
promoting development of financial instruments with gradual introduction
of mandatory financial security is a feasible approach. However, the
problem with this voluntary approach is whether, or to what extent,
operators are incentivized to seek financial coverage. Resorting to a
compensation instrument can increase the utility of risk-averse operators.
E
2892011-2012]
KY J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 4 No. 2
When seeking insurance, for example, operators choose to make certain
specified payments, instead of risking larger, uncertain liabilities. Thus the
incentives for seeking financial coverage depends on the probability that the
operator will be held liable, and on his personal attitude towards risk. If
liability rules are efficiently set and if operators are always held liable for
their natural resources damages, reasonable operators will seek insurance
coverage up to the probable amount of damage, or up to the value of their
assets, whichever is less. If operators are unlikely to be held liable for
natural resources damages, they will have no incentives to seek an efficient
level of financial coverage. Additionally, government may take measures to
make financial coverage attractive to potential injurers. For example,
favorable tax policy makes captive insurance more attractive. Norbert
Pelzer argues that indentifying the obligation of members to pay a premium
in a pooling system is desirable. 152 In the Flemish Draft Decree on
Environmental Policy (Draft Decree), an environmental guarantee account
is proposed as one financial guarantee, by which potentially liable parties
can make deposits to guarantee certain obligations. 153 According to the
Draft Decree, deposits are tax deductible and interest is added to individual
accounts.154 These designs incentivize potentially liable parties to seek
financial coverage.
Operators can shift the burden of compensation to collective
instruments by seeking a lower coverage of financial security. Further,
collective funds may also be used to dilute incentives for operators to seek
individual financial security to cover liability.
Under a voluntary scheme, the government is no longer responsible
for setting the ceiling of the financial requirement. Instead, the
government's role is only to promote the predictability of environmental
liability by improving monitoring, establishing databases, exchanging
information, and making assessment guidance for natural resources
damage. A predictable liability system is essential to financial security and
insurability. The diffuse and indiscriminate expansion of substantive tort
liability is widely regarded as an important contribution to the insurance
liability crisis in middle 1980s in the U.S.s5 5 In Europe, although the ELD
does not include a system of mandatory financial security, Commission
reports consistently recognize that a clear legal framework is essential to
152 Norbert Pelzer, International Pooling of Operators' Funds: An Option to Increase the
Amount of Financial Security to Cover Nuclear Liability, 79 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 37, 52 (2007).
153 Bocken, supra note 80, at 31.
1 Id.
... George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1589 (1987).
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promoting financial security. 15 Promotion of the financial market to cover
natural resources damage is also a role for government. With the
development of financial markets, mandatory financial requirement may be
introduced gradually. This gradual approach can be applied to certain
aspects of environmental damage, to types of dangerous activities, to
certain industrial sectors, or by remediation type. For example, the ELD
does not introduce a compulsory scheme of financial security. Instead, it
requires member states to take measures encouraging development of
financial security instruments and markets.'15  Much discussion concerns
whether or how a mandatory financial security scheme should be
established in Europe. During the enactment of the ELD, it was proposed
that the Directive introduce compulsory financial security first for
environmental damage to water and land, or for operators of integrated
pollution and prevention control (IPPC) operations.159 Some member states,
such as Spain, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic tried to introduce a
compulsory financial security scheme for particular sectors. 160
56 E.g., in a European Commission (DG ENV) 2009 report, it is stated that "insurability will
be enhanced through the creation of clear and consistent guidelines that can be applied to all EU MS and
all cases of environmental damage." See EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG ENV, supra note 47, at 63. In a
report prepared by the Ad-Hoc Industry, improving the predictability of liability risks under the ELD is
identified as the best and most direct way to promote financial security. See Survey of Industrial
Companies: Insurance and Other Financial Security Instruments and Remediation of Environmental
Damages under the EU Environmental Liability Directive, AD Hoc INDUSTRY (Feb. 2010), available at
http://www.endseurope.com/docs/100219b.pdf; ELD, supra note 6, art. 14.
15 EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG ENV, supra note 47, at 32-33.
1ss ELD, supra note 6, art. 14.
1 European Commission DG ENV, supra note 47, at 32.
160 Id. at 27.
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3. Model III: Optional Financial Cap
Compenation instruments taken voluntarily and
optional finanical caps
Collective compensation instruments
Compensation instruments irrespective of liability
In addition to increasing the predictability of environmental liability and
promoting markets to provide financial coverage, government may also
introduce a system with optional caps for financial security. After all, the
previous two systems may reduce an operator's duty to seek insurance
coverage, but do not necessarily limit liability itself. A recommendation to
this end was made in the Flemish Draft Decree on Environmental Policy. 161
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The Draft Decree adopts unlimited liability and imposes financial
responsibility on the permit-holder or the holder of a notification certificate
of classified installations.162 However, operators may limit liability for
natural resources damage by proving a guarantee fund up to regulated
amount. 6 3 Hence to enjoy the limitation of liability, operators must provide
a guarantee fund, guaranteeing that injured parties will be compensated for
natural resources damages above the amount for which operators are liable
to pay. If operators can prove availability of a financial guarantee fund,
their liability can be limited to a specified amount. Financial caps
incentivize operators to establish sizeable "optional limitation funds,"
providing greater certainty for risk-averse injurers. Individualized optional
caps provide greater differentiation of risk as compared to generalized
statutory caps, as they are tailored to the operator's specific risks and
possible natural resources damages.
The design of optional financial caps in the Draft Decree can shed
some light on the model incorporating voluntary financial security. 164In
case of a lack of capacity and high concentration on the insurance and
financial market, it is unfeasible to impose an obligation to seek a certain
amount of financial coverage. However, in these cases government may
impose an optional cap. By establishing guarantees up to the cap, the injurer
limits his liability up to that specified amount. This approach gives injurers
incentives to seek a financial coverage to a certain level in the undeveloped
market. At the same time, since operators are not obliged to seek coverage,
possible negative influences on market concentration under a mandatory
scheme are avoided.
V. THE CHOICE OF COMPENSATION INSTRUMENTS
It has been advised in the above-presented models that a variety of
compensation instruments should be developed and utilized to promote
competition. However, this does not mean that each instrument is fit for all
types operators and for all types of damage. Each instrument has its own
specific strengths and weakness when analyzed in the context of a specific
situation. 16 Thus, it is desirable to identify criteria for evaluating these
instruments, and to identify which instruments best suit specific situations.
To differentiate situations and identify criteria aids operators in choosing
suitable instruments, and informs lawmakers and insurance providers in
developing specific products and markets.
162 Id. at 31; Faure & Grimeaud, supra note 20, at 227.
163 Bocken, supra note 80, at 31.
i" Faure & Grimeaud, supra note 20, at 227.
165 See generally AD Hoc INDUSTRY, supra note 156.
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A. Coverage of Compensation Instruments
Before identifying specific criteria, it is worthwhile to devote some
attention to the coverage of instruments. It would be meaningless to
compare compensation instruments having totally different coverage.
Though this article focuses on compensation instruments for natural
resources damage, natural resources damages are often accompanied by
personal injury and property damage claims. According to the breadth of
the coverage, compensation instruments can be classified into three
categories: (1) stand-alone instruments, (2) instruments providing coverage
for general environmental damage, and (3) instruments providing coverage
for general liabilities.166
A specific type of instrument can sometimes take on different
forms. For example, insurance is a popular instrument used by operators to
cover liability and costs caused by natural resources damage. The insurance
can be a stand-alone policy, an environmental impairment policy, or a
general third party liability (GTPL) policy. The stand-alone policies provide
coverage only for specified natural resources damage.167 Environmental
impairment policies additionally compensate third parties for injury and
property damage as a result of a pollution event. 168 The GTPL policies
provide civil liability coverage, which may be extended to natural resources
damage. In the early stage, environmental damage claims are made against
insurers issuing GTPL policies. 169 However, over the years, it became
impossible to succeed with pollution claims under these policies through
the including of "absolute pollution exclusion clauses, 170 Uncertainties
created by courts are considered one important reason of the unavailability
of coverage for environmental risks. To insure against environmental risks
and overcome the uncertainty created by the courts, environmental
impairment policies and stand-alone policies began to develop in the mid
1980s. 17 I These new insurance products include not only liability insurance
166 CEA, NAVIGATING THE ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY DIRECTIVE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE




68 Id. at 13.
169 B. Prozesky-Kuschke, Insurance Against Damage Caused by Pollution, 2000 J. S. AFR.
L. 494, 499 (2000).
170 Id.
"' Kim Hollaender & Michelle Ann Kaminsky, The Past, Present, and Future of
Environmental Insurance Including a Case Study of MTBE Litigation, I ENVTL. FORENSICS 205, 206
(2000).
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for operators, contractors, and consultants, but also first party insurance
,,172such as "cleanup cost cap coverage.
The stand-alone policy has the advantage of allowing for a clear
distinction between civil and public law-based insurance coverage, and can
be adapted quickly and easily in response to emerging trends without
hampering the established client relationship.17' Further, the stand-alone
approach promotes the development of innovative, specialist, and flexible
solutions.17 4 However, it may also result in duplication of claims when a
traditional general policy exists, and increases administrative expenditures
required to maintain specific policies on a separate basis.175 Integrating
natural resources damage coverage into existing insurance policies has
advantages in saving development costs and administrative expenses.
However, the lack of statistical details (for example, separate premium and
tracking of claims) may hamper a proper risk assessment of claims
developments.176
A compensation instrument can be comprehensive or sector based.
A policy can be developed to cover natural resources damage generally, no
matter the type of operations conducted. For example, environmental
impairment liability mentioned above can provide coverage for third party
claims and cleanup costs for businesses, including chemical processing
plants, heavy manufacturing plants, waste treatment, storage, and disposal
facilities, hospitals, and utilities.177 There are also many instruments
designed specifically for a certain sector. For sectors where risk are unique
and exceptional, sector-based instruments can more effectively differentiate
risks and function more efficiently. For example, nuclear risk is a low
frequency high magnitude risk, which creates a challenge for the individual
insurers. Therefore it is usually excluded by general insurance policies, and
instead is insured by nuclear insurance pools. 17 8 Another example is the risk
sharing agreement, which is based on the similar level of risks and
172 See id.; William H. Howard, New Issues in Environmental Risk Insurance, 40 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 957, 959 (2004-2005).
173 See CEA, supra note 166, at 17. As discussed above, many administrative elements are
involved in the procedure of assessment of and compensation for natural resources damage. While the
compensation for traditional damage is more civil law based, the elements of administrative law have
also an influence on the insurance policy. Thus a stand-alone policy can better distinguish between civil
law and public law instruments.
7 Id.
1 Id.
76 Id at 18.
'77 Hollaender & Kaminsky, supra note 171, at 206.
78 Marcus Radetzki & Marian Radetzki, Private Arrangements to Cover Large-scale
Liabilities Caused by Nuclear and Other Industrial Catastrophes, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.
180, 186 (2000).
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capability of mutual monitoring among members. 179 Thus the risk sharing
agreement is usually sector-based. 80
B. Criteria to Evaluate the Instruments
Liability insurance, first party and direct insurance, risk sharing
agreement, environmental funds and other guarantees can all be used to
compensate for natural resources damage. Those instruments have different
potential in reducing Calabresi's social costs.' 8' Primary costs reduction
focuses on how to prevent natural resources damage.18 2 Secondary costs
reduction requires risk spreading or to shift the burden to the less risk
averse parties.183 This aim is similar to compensation, but is divergent in
some aspects. Risk spreading and risk shifting have only a limited purpose
in the context of natural resources damage. Many environmental elements
are res commune or res nullius, or owned communally. Thus damage to
publically owned resources is automatically maximally spread.
Compensation instruments built on liability play only a limited role in risk
spreading and risk shifting. However, these instruments are desirable since
they limit risk spreading to parties who contribute to the risks. Different
from secondary costs reduction, compensation instruments emphasizes
restoration of the damaged environment, regardless of whether risk
spreading is involved or not. Besides, tertiary costs should also be taken
into account in evaluating the use of compensation instruments, since it is
an essential factor in determining the actual availability of an instrument in
the market.
As far as primary costs reduction (prevention) is concerned, several
questions are relevant: Who finances the instruments? Are their
contributions to the instruments risk-based? If instruments are not financed
by those contributing to the risks, then recourse against contributors should
be available to deter risky behaviors. Whether operators are liable in tort
under the various instruments is also important. When designing specific
compensation instruments, one should determine which parties could best
access information, assess risk, and prevent risk- government, operators, or
financial product providers?
'
79 Id. at 187-88.
"s E.g., in the U.S. the Price Anderson Act establishes a mutual pool by retrospective
premiums for nuclear liability. A solidarity agreement in Germany also creates a similar system. Pelzer,
supra note 153, at 42-45; Simon Carroll, Perspective on the Pros and Cons ofa Pooling-type Approach
to Nuclear Third Party Liability, 81 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 75, 88-93 (2008).
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The following questions need to be answered in evaluating the role
of compensation instruments in secondary costs reduction (compensation):
Whether there is risk spreading in this instrument? When is the instrument
established: before the damage happens or ex post? When is the
compensation due? As soon as there is an imminent threat of damage so
that prevention measures can be financed through the compensation
instrument, after the occurrence of damage but before liability is
established, or only after liability has been established? What is the capacity
of the specific instrument to compensate for natural resources damage?
To evaluate the tertiary costs, one needs to consider the following
factors: Do the providers of a certain instrument have incentives to control
loading costs, and are they profit seeking? Whether a specific entity needs
to be established to run a certain instrument? Whether the amount paid by
operators to obtain coverage of one compensation instrument is recoverable
if no damage happens?
C. Factors Influencing the Choice ofInstruments
When deciding which instrument is more suitable in specific
conditions, many factors need to be considered. Most importantly, it must
be determined if liable parties are identifiable. When liable parties can be
identified, liability rules can be used as an instrument to prevent and
compensate for natural resources damage. Liability insurance is then the
most popular instrument. If the potential injurer can transfer risk to insurers
with a premium reflecting actuarial costs plus administrative costs, liability
insurance can guarantee compensation without reducing the preventive
incentives of potentially liable parties, making this solution most
desirable.' 84 When liable parties cannot be identified, alternative
instruments must be used, such as direct insurance or environmental funds.
A related issue is the type of damage. For example, soil pollution
often has localized influence, with identifiable liable parties. In these cases
liability insurance can be a useful compensation instrument. Air pollution is
of a more diffuse nature and identifying liable parties is more difficult. In
that case environmental funds may be a more promising instrument than
liability insurance.
Another factor is the nature of damage: is it general or catastrophic
damage? A catastrophe means that there is damage with low frequency and
high severity.' Self-insurance may be better suited for predictable risks,
while risk sharing pools are able to cover less predictable risks as well since
184 See Gerhard Wagner, Tort Law and Liability Insurance, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS
386 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
85 Vdronique Bruggeman, Compensating Catastrophe Victims: A Comparative Law and
Economic Approach 6 (2010).
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the contribution can be paid ex post. 1 6 High severity imposes high
requirements on the capacity. The use of the financial market is an
instrument with high potential to increase the capacity of insurance or risk
sharing agreements. Financial instruments have been developed to cover
natural disasters, but have only limited use in the field of man-made
disasters. 87
The size of enterprises creating environmental risks also plays a
role in the choice of instruments. The guarantees provided by potential
injurers themselves and bank guarantees are may be more readily available
to larger enterprises than they are to small or medium enterprises (SME).
An ex ante established instrument is desirable as it can provide a securable
guarantee. Sometimes big companies may have the resources to provide ex
post and ad hoc instruments to compensate for natural resources damage. 18
However, for SMEs with greater risk of insolvency, an ex post instrument is
not reliable and may lack the assets to establish ad hoc compensation
instruments.
The sector in which the potential injurers operate is also a factor to
be considered. For example, in highly technical sectors, such as the nuclear
industry, it is the operators that have the best information about risks
created and how to control such risks. Thus cooperation between operators
via a risk sharing agreement, for example, would be an effective
compensation instrument. For more traditional sectors, where insurers have
developed corresponding products based on statistical risk and claim
experience, the expertise of insurers can make insurance a competitive
choice.
.6 Garan Skogh, A European Nuclear Accident Pool, 33 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.
274, 282 (2008).
187 Using capital markets to cover catastrophe happens in practice. However, they are mainly
linked to natural disasters. A strong link between capital market instruments and man-made accidents is
still rare. According to a report by Swiss Re, among the risks securitized by the capital market from
1997 to July 2010, industrial accidents account for only one percent ($405 million) of the covered risks.
See MARIA WITTMAN ET AL., INSURANCE-LINKED SECURITIES MARKET UPDATE 7 (2010), available at
http://www.artemis.bm/articles/swissre%/ 20update%/ 20h 1201 0.pdf; V6ronique Bruggeman, Capital
Market Instruments for Natural Catastrophe and Terrorism Risks: a Bright Future?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP.
10136 (2010).
'88 The compensation trust fund established by BP after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill is an
example of this. Instead of seeking insurance coverage from the market, BP has chosen to be self
insured by its captive insurance company with coverage of $ 700million. This amount is far from
enough to cover all damage and costs that arise after the accident. Thus BP established a trust fund of $
20 billion to compensate for the removal costs, natural resources damages and individual victims. See
Gloria Gonzales, BP Oil Spill Damages to Stretch Insurance Coverage, OIL PRICE.COM (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://oilprice.com/Environment/Oil-Spills/BP-Oil-Spill-Damages-to-Stretch-Insurance-Coverage.html.
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VI. COMPARING VARIOUS INDIVIDUAL INSTRUMENTS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Different compensation instruments can be developed to
compensate for natural resources damage, each having different influences
on the reduction of social costs. This section tries to compare such
instruments, considering the evaluation criteria mentioned in the section
above. The first element to be compared is the scope of coverage. Then
instruments are compared according to the three categories of social costs.
From the perspective of primary costs, three factors are compared: the
relationship with liability, the setting of contributions (who finances the
instruments and how are the contributions allocated) and their ability to
control moral hazard and adverse selection. Then the potential in reducing
secondary costs of those instruments is compared, considering the time
necessary to establish the compensation instruments, the time necessary to
provide compensation, whether there is risk spreading, and capacity. The
last issue to be compared is the tertiary costs created by each instrument.
After those comparisons, policy recommendations are given for specific
instruments.
A. Liability Insurance
Liability insurance is the most popular instrument used by potential
injurers. The deterrent effect of liability insurance remains so long as the
premium an insured pays corresponds with his actual risk.189 Setting a risk-
based premium for natural resources liability insurance is not an easy task,
considering factual and legal uncertainties.190 Insurers are experts in valuing
uncertainties, managing risks, and in handling claims. Both feature rating
and experience rating are used by insurers to set premiums.19' Liability
insurance can create moral hazard and adverse selection problems, which
can be controlled through deductibles, monitoring, and risk
differentiation.1 92 However, even if risk-based premiums are used and
moral hazard and adverse selection are controlled, efficient deterrence may
still be unachievable because potential injurers are only incentivized to seek
insurance coverage up to the amount of their own assets. In spite of this
189 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 949-50 (1988).
190 For example, uncertain causation, multiple potential injurers, and long time latency
between the harmfiul activities and the manifestation of the damage are all factual uncertainties in
establishing liability for natural resources damage. There are also legal uncertainties about liability for
natural resources damage. For example, sometimes, judges use a deep pocket policy to favor the
compensation, by interpreting the policy language to expand the scope of coverage. See id. at 960-69.
'9' Id. at 949-50.
192 Id.
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inefficiency, liability insurance is generally thought to encourage safety, as
it alleviates insolvency problems and controls risks.'9 3 Additionally,
empirical analysis supports the use of insurance. A recent study compared
accidental underground fuel tank leaks in two states over a fourteen-year
period. 194 The research shows that the shift from a state-level government
assurance programs to private insurance markets reduced the frequency of
underground fuel tank leaks by more than twenty percent. 195
Liability insurance is established before damage happens, and
compensation is only awarded when liability is established. Thus the
difficulties in finding liability will still prevent liability insurance from
providing sufficient compensation. Under a liability insurance policy, risks
are spread among potential injurers participating in the same pool.
Reinsurance and capital markets can be used by insurers to increase
capacity.
As far as tertiary costs are concerned, a competitive market will
give insurers incentives to reduce loading costs and provide the products at
reasonable costs. 196 Compulsory insurance is a frequently proposed
alternative to overcome some drawbacks of voluntary liability insurance, as
it can incentivize operators to seek insurance and reduces problems such as
adverse selection and insolvency. 197 However, compulsory insurance is
only efficient if it is provided to operators seeking liability insurance; if
moral hazard is controlled; if risk-based premiums are used; and if a
competitive market exists.198 One example is nuclear insurance, where a
monopoly exists and insurers are forced to pool together to attain sufficient
coverage given the catastrophic nature of nuclear damage. 199 In France,
Electricit6 de France (EDF) is the established nuclear production monopoly,
and the EDF is required to provide financial security up its liability cap of E
91 million per accident. 2 0 0 The EDF chooses to fund the first two-thirds
through its own financial reserves, and funding for the last third comes
from French insurance pool Assuratome, and a European mutual
193 See Jeffrey Kehne, supra note 84, at 405-12.
194 Haitao Yin et al., Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private
Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents? 13-15 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15100, 2009).
19 Id. at 3.
196 See CALABRESI, supra note 19, at 26-30.
1 Wagner, supra note 184, at 397-98; Faure & Grimeaud, supra note 20, at 181-82.
1 BRUGGEMAN, supra note 185, at 222.
1 Michael Faure & Karine Fiore, The Civil Liability of European Nuclear Operators: Which
Coverage for the New 2004 Protocols? Evidence from France, 8 INT'L ENVTL AGREEMENTs 227, 230-
36 (2008).
200 Id. at 232.
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association ELINI.201 To cover the E 31 million, EDF pays a premium of C
6.4 million per year for all its reactors, which is argued in some literature to
be 355 times higher than its actuarial premium. 202
B. First Party Insurance and Direct Insurance
In addition to liability insurance, first-party insurance and direct
insurance can also be used to cover natural resources damage. First-party
insurance directly covers risk of damage to a particular victim or specific to
a particular site, making it easier to identify circumstances influencing
risk.203  Individuals can use first-party insurance to cover their personal
injury or property damage. However, natural resources damage often
concerns public natural resources, which are owned collectively by all.
Public authorities often act as trustees of public resources, thus having
standing to bring natural resources damages claims. 2 04 Nonetheless, without
individual victims first-party insurance is not as effective for compensating
public natural resources as it is for compensating traditional damage. First-
party insurance does effectively cover on-site damage and cleanup costs of
the polluters themselves. For example, in the U.S. cleanup costs cap
policies are available to cover the costs overruns when cleanup expenses
exceed projected costs. 205 Brownfield Restoration and Development
Insurance can provide coverage for properties with known environmental
problems on which there are planned remediation and planned
development.206
Alternatively, under a direct insurance policy the potential injurer is
covered for any damages suffered by third parties damaged on the insured
party's particular site.207 Thus unlike the pure first-party insurance funded
by innocent victims, in a direct insurance policy, it is the polluters that pay
for damages. One example of environmental damage insurance is MSV,
introduced in 1998 in the Netherlands.208 MSV provides integrated
coverage of all environmental damage occurring on or from the insured site,
201 Id.
202 Id. at 236.
203 Michael Faure, Environmental Damage Insurance in Theory and Practice, in AN
INTRODUCTION To THE LAw AND ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ISSUES IN INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN, 292-93 (Timothy Swanson ed., 2002).
204 See Boyd, supra note 54, at 266-67.
20s Ralph A. Demeo et al., Insuring against Environmental Unknowns, 23 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 61, 82-83 (2007).
206 See Hollaender & Kaminsky, supra note 171, at 206.
207 Michael Faure, Environmental Damage Insurance in Theory and Practice 19 (2001),
available at http://www.cserge.ucl.ac.uk/Faure.pdf.
208 Id at 29-32.
3012011-2012]
KY J. EQUINE, AGR., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol.4 No.2
provided it concerns pollution of the soil or water.2 0 9 The MSV policy is a
combination of first-party insurance and direct insurance. It is first-party
insurance in the sense that it is the potential polluters that are insured for the
clean-up costs of their sites and the costs for the repair of damage. 21 0 The
insured can also choose a policy to provide protection against the damage to
third parties, which is direct insurance.2 11 Under the MSV policy,
compensation is triggered when the contract condition is satisfied, as agreed
to between the insured and the insurer.212 The advantage of direct insurance
is that liability is undisputed. This may be desirable from the perspectives
of both deterrence and compensation. On the one hand, the unpredictability
of the tort system is removed; and on the other hand, compensation can be
awarded before the liability is established. However, why would potential
injurers seek coverage for damage suffered by other parties or the public, if
they cannot be held liable? Questions arise as to whether the insurers are
able to indentify the covered damage and execute an efficient risk
differentiation. Another essential issue is the compatibility of insurance
coverage with administrative procedures of damage assessment and
restoration.
C. Risk-Sharing Agreement
Sometimes risks are unpredictable, so much so that the insurance
market may be reluctant to provide coverage. In these circumstances a risk-
sharing agreement is a useful alternative, because the establishment of an ex
ante risk pool is no longer necessary. The highly technical and complicated
risks some industrial activities favor use of risk-sharing policies. Such
policies are especially useful in covering nuclear liability and liability for
marine pollution by oil. 213 The problems of moral hazard and adverse
selection can be effectively controlled through mutual monitoring.2 14 Three
approaches can be used to finance the risk pool: an ex ante payment,
reserves, or an ex ante agreement to pay if damage happens. 2 15 The ex ante
payment approach has security advantages, as the availability of funds, but






213 Michael Faure & Karine Fiore, The Coverage of the Nuclear Risk in Europe: Which
Alternative?, 33 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 288, 301(2008); see also Faure, supra note 207, at 8.
214 See Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 30, at 274.
215 Faure & Fiore, supra note 213, at 306-07.
216 Id. at 306.
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guaranteed by some financial instruments.2 17 Monitoring is necessary for
both reserves for ex ante agreements, to ensure the amount is still available
in case of damage.2 18 Implicit risk sharing is available for the nuclear risk
under the Price Anderson Act, since the majority of compensation will be
collected through retrospective premiums paid by nuclear operators
collectively. 219 Risk sharing agreements have great cost saving potential,
since these pools are not profit-seeking, and payment or reserves are not
actually lost if no damage occurs.
D. Environmental Funds
There are many kinds of environmental funds, which can be used to
compensate for natural resources damage when liable parties are unable to
provide full compensation or can intervene when no liability is established.
For example, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) is established
under the OPA.2 20 According to the OPA, the OSLTF shall be available for
the costs for removal actions consistent with the National Contingency Plan
and the natural resources damages. 2 21 The Public authorities taking removal
actions can present claims directly to the fund.222 Other claims must be
made to liable parties first, and then presented to the OSLTF for
uncompensated damages.223 The OSLTF also provides compensation for a
responsible party entitled to a defense to liability or a limitation of
liability.2 24 In these circumstances, a fund can both finance cleanup
measures quickly and complement liable parties' compensation where
insufficient. In other words, compensation funds have added value in
comparison to other compensation instruments, because they can intervene
when no liability arises, and provide an upper layer of compensation in
addition to other instruments where insufficient. As timely response and
restoration is essential for natural resources damage, and funds providing
finances for cleanup and restoration measures before the liability is
established is especially desirable.
In spite of the desirable roles played by funds, when instruments
adequately cover liability there is no clear reason why funds should be
preferred to liability insurance. Funds are disadvantageous as they poorly
217 Id. 306-07.
218 Id. at 307-08.
219 See Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 30, at 242-44.
220 Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, EMERGENCY MGMT., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/osweroel/content/learning/oilfund.htm (last updated Jan. 27, 2011).
221 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a) (2012).
222 33 U.S.C. § 2712(c), (d) (2012).
223 33 U.S.C. §2713(a), (b) (2012).
224 33 U.S.C. § 2708 (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 2712(b) (2012).
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differentiate risks and administrative costs are often high.2 25 To ensure that
environmental funds function efficiently, clearly defined coverage and
compensation procedures are necessary. Funds should be financed by
potential injurers rather than via general revenues. General revenues
funding shifts the burden from polluters to the general public, thus reducing
prevention and deterrence incentives. Funding environmental funds by
polluters is an important criterion for effective and efficient natural
resources compensation. However there is an exception. If a fund covers
only historical damage and is of a temporary nature, a shift in costs bearing
is not necessarily inefficient. One example is the SUBAT foundation
established in the Netherlands.22 6 The origin of the SUBAT foundation can
be traced to a regulation of the Dutch Ministry of the Environment
concerning "preventive measures to be followed by gas stations in order to
prevent soil contamination."22 7 This regulation imposed severe
requirements on licensees of gas stations, and made the termination of the
activity costly.228 The SUBAT foundation was created to provide licensees
with an opportunity to terminate activities without paying for historic soil
contamination. 2 29 The Foundation covers licensees who reported to it before
August 1993 and promised not to start a new outlet on the same
premises.230 The cleanups undertaken by SUBAT are financed through
contributions from the oil companies, and these costs are then passed on to
consumers. 231 In the other words, it is the consumers of the gasoline, rather
the licensees of gas stations who pay for cleanup costs. 232 However,
SUBAT is efficient, as the foundation is concerned only with historic
damage and is temporary. SUBAT came into force in 1991 and the owners
of gas stations had to apply before August 1993.233 Given these
arrangements, SUBAT does not distort incentives in the long run, and
successfully resulted in cleanup and termination of gas stations. This
restoration would otherwise have been impossible.
225 See Faure & Hartlief, supra note 120, at 323-24.




230 Id at 80.
231 Id. at 81.
232Faure & Verheij, supra note 37, at 81.
233 Id. at 82.
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E. Guarantees by the Polluters
Security mechanisms provided by the liable parties or a third party
guarantor can also be used by (potentially) liable parties to cover their
liabilities. This includes a variety of instruments including self-provided
insurance instruments such as mortgages, liens, deposits, trusts funds and
escrow agreement; as well as instruments provided by third parties, such as
bank guarantees, sureties, and corporation guarantees. For example, in the
U.S. many instruments can be used to achieve financial responsibility for
hazardous waste storage facilities to ensure closure, post -closure care, and
third-party liability. These include trust funds, surety bonds, letters of
234credit, insurance, financial tests and corporate guarantees. However,
except for guarantees provided by a parent corporation, these instruments
are usually only available for large companies. Small companies are
typically unable to pass the financial tests necessary to prove deep pocket,
are unable to provide sufficient unencumbered assets or cash assurance, or
cannot seek a guarantee from financial institutions by showing good
financial status and credit rating. Larger companies can more easily satisfy
these requirements, but small and medium enterprises often cannot. Where
possible, the capacity of small and medium enterprises to compensate
damages can be assured when a parent company meeting financial
standards agrees to satisfy coverage requirements.2 35 Some instruments
have advantages in costs saving, such as self-insurance and captives. Other
instruments, like bank guarantee or sureties, are not cheaply available.
Additional governmental oversight is needed for these mechanisms.
Regulation of reserves is essential for self-insurance and captives.236 The
financial status of potentially responsible parties, and their parent
corporations as guarantors, should be monitored. Guarantees provided by
third parties also need to be irrevocable.
The table below gives an analytical overview of the potential of the
above mentioned compensation instruments in reducing Calabresi's social
costs, and makes policy recommendation accordingly.
234 40 C.F.R. § 264.146-.147 (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 265.146-.147 (2006).
235 See Alternative Financial Guarantees for Environmental Liability under the ELD, supra
note 37, at 160-62.
236 Michael Faure, Alternative Compensation Mechanisms as Remedies for Uninsurability of
Liability, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 455, 459 (2004).
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VII. TOWARDS A MULTILAYERED APPROACH To COMPENSATE FOR
NATURAL RESOURCES DAMAGE
A few indicators in choosing compensation instruments were given
in Section V. Then Section VI compared five instruments according to their
coverage and potential in reducing three kinds of social costs. According to
the above analysis, this section tries to use indicators to design a
compensation system for natural resources damage. The primary criteria in
choosing instruments and establishing a compensation system is whether
the liable party is identifiable. Taking into account this distinction, other
indicators are also briefly examined.
A. When Liable Party Is Identifiable
When a liable party can be identified, tort law provides the polluter
with incentive to prevent damage. As the law and economic literature
proves, if the magnitude of damage can be accurately measured (under
strict liability), or the due care level can be efficiently set (under negligence
rules), a fully solvent party will have efficient incentives to prevent the
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damage.2 37 However, the potentially magnitude of natural resources damage
is great, and may push a potentially liable party into insolvency. Liability
insurance is thus a useful compensation instrument: by providing an ex ante
guarantee ensuring availability of assets in case of damage, liability
insurance can both promote compensation for natural resources damage and
alleviate preventive inefficiencies caused by insolvency.
Not only operators, but also financial institutions, public
authorities, and insurers are experts in risk spreading and risk
differentiation. By spreading risks among a group of members exposed to
the same type of risks, the utility of risk averse parties can be increased and
the capacity of compensation raised. By establishing premiums that
correspond to an insured party's contribution to risks, the deterrent
incentives created by liability rules remain in effect. Considering
information asymmetry problems, liability insurance may also result in
moral hazard and adverse selection issues. However, insurers are
specialized in dealing with those problems: both experience rating and
feature rating can be used to differentiate risks, and monitoring and limited
coverage can be used to control moral hazard. These Insurers are better
skilled than operators, financial institutions, and public authorities in
contributing risk to injurers, thus providing better deterrent incentives. If
the market is competitive, insurers are incentivized to reduce loading costs.
Despite insurers specialized skills in risk spreading and
differentiation, liability insurance may not always create efficient
incentives. Potentially liable parties are only incentivized to seek insurance
up to the value of their assets owned, meaning that adverse selection may
result, limiting the capacity of insurance.2 38 Thus compulsory insurance is
an oft proposed remedy to these problems.239 However, as discussed above,
compulsory insurance can aggravate problems of moral hazard and market
concentration. 24 0 Therefore, the introduction of compulsory insurance
should be done with caution: it is only efficient if the scheme applies
exclusively to those demanding liability insurance, if moral hazard is
controlled, if risk-based premiums are used, and where competitive market
exist.241
237 Shavell, supra note 31, at 4.
238 See Faure, supra note 117, at 153-55.
239 For example, Wagner favored a private but mandatory insurance, rather than private
voluntary insurance and public compensation schemes. See Gerhard Wagner, (Un)insurability and the
Choice between Market Insurance and Public Compensation Systems, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 87, 87-112 (William Van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 2007).
240 Faure, supra note 117, at 157-61.
241 BRUGGEMAN, supra note 185, at 222.
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A preference for liability insurance where liable parties are
identifiable does not mean that liability insurance is the only necessary
compensation instrument. There are still some scenarios under which other
instruments may play a role. Sometimes the insurance market is highly
concentrated, thus insurers are either too reluctant to provide coverage or
only provide policies at very high prices.24 2 Under these conditions, the
potentially liable parties must resort to other compensation instruments.
Risk sharing agreement, captives, and guarantees provided by operators
243themselves or by third parties are often used alternatives.
As mentioned above, the sector or industry to which a potentially
liable party belongs to is also a factor influencing choice of instruments.
For highly technical sectors in which operators have better access
information concerning differentiation and control risks, such as the nuclear
and oil transportation sectors, a risk sharing agreement is a useful
alternative. 244 For example, in the nuclear sector, if there is an equal or
comparable level of nuclear safety and security, and equal or comparable
economic conditions and legal framework, the pooling system can be
efficient. A risk sharing agreement has also an advantage in dealing with
less predictable risks, because an ex ante payment of the share is no longer
necessary. It can also reduce costs in the sense that contributions can be
paid ex post, or payment is recoverable if it is paid ex ante, and less damage
happened during the policy time.246
Larger companies can also use captives or other guarantees if
liability insurance is unavailable or too expensive. For example, nuclear
companies can use captive companies to cover their first layer of liability.24 7
Captives are attractive to these companies because they adhere to minimum
capital or surplus levels, actively managing the risk portfolio through
diversification and cessions to the reinsurance market and favorable tax
policies. 248 A bank guarantee is also a possible alternative. Bank guarantees
242 For example, the nuclear insurance market has been organized on a national and non-
competitive basis, since the development of the civil nuclear industry. This has led to high nuclear
insurance premiums. During the 17" and 18'h centuries, English commercial vessels were repeatedly
seized or destroyed by the enemy navies. Those catastrophic losses made private insurers unable or
unwilling to underwrite to write such risks. The Protection and Indemnity Clubs have begun to develop
to cover the risks created by marine transportation in response to the market needs since the mid-191h
centuries. Norman J. Ronneberg, Jr., An Introduction to the Protection & Indemnity Clubs and the
Marine Insurance They Provide, 3 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1991).
243 See supra Part V.A-B.
24 See Radetzki & Radetzki, supra note 178.
4 Pelzer, supra note 154, at 50-53.
246 Faure, supra note 236, at 471.
247 Faure & Grimeaud, supra note 20, at 215.
248 Id.
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also have the disadvantage of being expensive, as banks are usually not
specialized in risk spreading and are themselves risk averse.249
Even where liability insurance is available, its capacity is not
unlimited. Considering the potentially catastrophic effects of natural
resources damage, other instruments can provide an upper layer of
compensation. The risk sharing agreement discussed above can act as an
upper layer instruments. 25 0 Environmental funds are frequently used
instruments to intervene when others fail. In addition to providing an upper
layer of compensation, environmental funds can also be used to finance the
cleanup of natural resources damage when a threat is imminent, or when
other financial resources are not immediately available.25 1 It is worth noting
that environmental funds should be organized in such a way that potential
injurers, instead of the public at large, finance the fund.
B. When the Liable Party Is Not Identifiable
As far as natural resources damage is concerned, it is possible that
the liable party cannot be identified, or causal links cannot be established.
In these situations liability cannot be established, and consequently liability
insurance is no longer a useful. The alternatives providing compensation
irrespective of liability can then come into play, such as first-party and
direct insurance, and environmental funds.
In the context of natural resources damage, first-party insurance has
only a limited role to play.252 Irrespective of personal injury and property
damage, the victims of natural resources damage are the public, whose
interests are minor and indirect. Collective action problems exist, thus
disincentivizing operators to seek insurance coverage for natural resources
253damage to the fullest extent. In some jurisdictions, public authorities are
given standing to sue for natural resources damage.254 First-party insurance
can be used as an instrument to cover on-site remediation costs. In these
circumstances, polluters themselves suffer damages and they can insure
against the costs of remediation and restoration with their own resources.
249 See supra Part VI.E.
250 E.g., 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4) (2010) (explaining the requirement that nuclear power
plants of a given capacity must seek insurance up to $375 million, and in the event damage exceeds this
amount, licensees will pool together to cover the second layer of compensation).
251 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a), (d) (2012) (granting State officials immediate access to
funds if necessary for the immediate removal of an oil discharge, or the mitigation or prevention of a
threat of discharge).
252 Amanda Leiter, Environmental Insurance: Does it Defy the Rules?, 25 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REv. 259, 313-14 (2001).
253 See supra Part VI.B.
254 Id.
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Direct insurance is a more promising alternative, by which owners of
potentially injurious sites seek insurance coverage benefitting third
255parties.
Direct insurance is advantageous in that liability rules may then be
avoided. However, a causal link between damage and an insured site must
still be established. When the liable party cannot be identified,
environmental funds may prove the superior compensation scheme. While
insurers are more specialized in risk differentiation, environmental funds
are often operated by public authorities who have little incentive to making
sufficient risk differentiation and control tertiary costs. Ideally funds are
financed by potential injurers, rather than by the public at large. The
operators of funds need to be incentivized to differentiate risk and reduce
administrative costs. If environmental funds are being financed by potential
injurers, these instruments can also promote deterrence. Since liable parties
cannot be identified, the environmental costs cannot be born by liable
parties and thus are externalized. Environmental funds can still make
otherwise externalized costs internalized by the injurers as a whole. Hence,
an additional level of deterrence can be achieved.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Natural resources damage has gradually gained importance in
liability law. Besides economic losses, natural resources damage also
results in significant ecological, aesthetic, and cultural losses. These
damages need not only to be prevented, but also to be restored and
adequately compensated. This article tries to establish a compensation
system providing optimal prevention and compensation of natural resources
damage.
Regulation, liability rules, and compensation mechanisms can be
combined to prevent and compensate for natural resources damage. This
article presents three models utilizing various compensation instruments,
based on availability of mandatory financial security. In all three models,
regulation is the primary instruments used to prevent natural resources
damage. However, effectiveness of these models is limited by availability
of information and administrative costs. Regulation alone cannot create
efficient preventive incentives. Thus liability rules are necessary to provide
additional deterrent incentives. Natural resources damage can be
catastrophic, and injurers may be insolvent. Hence compensation
mechanisms can be used to guarantee or increase the capacity of injures to
pay. Considering the difficulties in establishing liability rules,
compensation mechanisms can also play a role when no liability is
established.
255 See Faure & Grimeaud, supra note 20, at 217-24.
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When the market providing financial coverage is competitive, a
mandatory financial security scheme is desirable. Different compensation
instruments can be used to fulfill the obligation of potential injurers to
provide financial coverage. However, where the market is uncompetitive
and there is reluctance to provide such coverage, a voluntary financial
security scheme is more feasible. In these circumstances, government
should take measures to promote the insurance market, and gradually
introduce a mandatory scheme. Additionally, a scheme with an optional
financial cap may also be useful, as it encourages potential injurers to seek
additional financial coverage.
Different compensation instruments can be used to satisfy financial
requirements. However, every instrument need not be applied to every
situation. If the liable parties can be identified, traditional liability insurance
is the preferable compensation instrument. Environmental funds can be
used to provide an additional layer of compensation, financing the cleanup
of natural resources damage ex ante when necessary. However, when the
insurance market is uncompetitive, alternatives to liability insurance are
more effective. For example, in highly technical sectors operators often
have informational advantages, and can conduct effective mutual
monitoring. In these situations a risk sharing agreement is favorable. Large
companies can also use captives and bank guarantees.
If liable parties cannot be indentified, liability insurance is
ineffective, and alternatives such as direct insurance and environmental
funds should be introduced. When natural resources damage is attributable
to an insured site, direct insurance is preferable to environmental funds.
Where the natural resources damage cannot be attributed to an insured site,
environmental funds are more effective instruments.
Further research may be necessary to analyze compensation
instruments developed in recent years for natural catastrophes, which may
be used as natural resources damage compensation instruments. Although
natural catastrophes and natural resources damage are distinct there may be
some parallels, specifically concerning identification of liable injurers.
Models of government intervention in case of natural catastrophes (such as
government providing insurance or acting as reinsurer of last resort)25 6
could also be usefully called upon to provide compensation for natural
resources damage. These and other issues undoubtedly merit further
research into this fascinating area of ecological losses.
256 See Vronique Bruggeman et al., The Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophe Risks?, 35
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 369 (2010).
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